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Abstract
This thesis considers the role of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the Canadian
banking sector. Although the relevance of CSR continues to be debated, this analysis
starts from the position that CSR is now a fact of life for modern banks and tests whether
Canadian banks are demonstrating CSR behavior through their adoption of the Equator
Principles: a series of guidelines on the management of social and environmental issues
that banks voluntarily commit to follow in their project financing activities. This thesis
concludes that examples of CSR behavior can be observed as Canadian banks continue to
define the scope of their involvement with the EPs. However, this conclusion is tempered
by the finding that self-interested business motivations are also behind EPs adoption. Any
expectations that we might arrive at “socially responsible” banks should therefore be
tempered by the reality that CSR has yet to gain universal implementation in Canadian
banking.
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1
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview of Thesis Topic and Contribution
This thesis considers the emerging role of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
in the Canadian banking sector. Although the relevance of CSR continues to be debated
in academic circles, the analysis for this thesis starts from the position that CSR is
increasingly becoming a fact of life for modern Canadian banks. As a result, this thesis
reflects the pragmatic view of commentators who claim that CSR is now a phenomenon
that can be observed in varying degrees in the practices and behavior of modern
businesses. Writers in this area argue that CSR has largely “won the battle of ideas” in
that, practically speaking, few businesses today would argue against the need for CSR
and it is likely to remain important to our political, regulatory, academic and corporate
agendas.1
The research proposition for this thesis is that Canadian banks are demonstrating
CSR behavior through the steps they are taking to implement and comply with the
Equator Principles (EPs). The EPs were chosen for study because they represent a
potential real-world example of CSR: a voluntary framework “for determining, assessing
and managing environmental and social risk in projects.”2 The EPs were developed by

1

See e.g., Norman Keith, Corporate Crime and Accountability in Canada – From Prosecutions to
Corporate Social Responsibility (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2011) [Keith] at 254 and 275.
2

See online at: http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/about-ep/about-ep. As at the date of
submission of this thesis, the EPs are undergoing an update process that will be implemented in 2013 and
2014. A draft of the new principles (referred to in this thesis as EP III) was released for stakeholder
consultation and public comment on August 13, 2012 and the formal comment period closed on October
12, 2012. The updated principles were formally launched and are effective from June 4, 2013, but there is a
transition period in place to allow banks to continue using the current version of the EPs (the EP II) until
December 31, 2013. As such, this thesis focuses on the current version of the EP II (which are referred to
generally in this thesis as the “EPs”) and the requirements they currently prescribe for member banks.
Chapters 4 and 7 will provide a discussion of the EP III update process in order to support further study in
this area as the updated principles are implemented in the second half of 2013 and into 2014.

2
major international private banks, together with the International Finance Corporation
(IFC) and the World Bank Group on June 4, 2003. At the time of writing, seven Canadian
financial institutions (including all of the “Big-5” Canadian banks) have formally adopted
the EPs: Royal Bank of Canada; TD Canada Trust; Bank of Montreal; Bank of Nova
Scotia; Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce; Export Development Canada; and
Manulife Financial.3
This thesis seeks to contribute to the growing body of work on CSR in the
financial services sector generally and in the banking industry specifically. CSR scholars
and legal practioners now recognize the financial industry as a sector that is particularly
relevant to CSR. They argue that the sector is relevant, not because of its own direct
social and ecological footprints, but rather because of impacts that arise through
allocation of capital to other business sectors, primarily in infrastructure development and
natural resource exploitation.4 More to the point, scholars in this area argue that the EPs,
taken together with other environmental and social initiatives, are evidence of a shift
toward greater importance being attributed to CSR considerations in the banking sector.5

3

See the list of EPs member banks online at: http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/membersreporting/members-and-reporting (accessed as of June 28, 2013). This list can be sorted by country or
geographic region.
4

See e.g., Benjamin J. Richardson, “Financing Environmental Change: A New Role for Canadian
Environmental Law” (2003) 49 McGill L.J. 145 [Richardson-Financing Change] at 147-148. See also e.g.,
Paul Q. Watchman, Angela Delfino and Juliette Addison of the law firm LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene &
MacRae, “EP 2: The Revised Equator Principles: Why hard-nosed bankers are embracing soft law
principles” at 4, electronic copy available online at:
http://www.deweyleboeuf.com/~/media/Files/inthenews/EP2TheRevisedEquatorPrinciplesWhyhardnosedb
ankersareembracingsoftlawprinciples.ashx.
5

See e.g., John M. Conley and Cynthia A. Williams, “Global Banks as Global Sustainability Regulators?”
(2011) 33 Law & Policy 542 [Conley and Williams] at 543 and 552. The authors argue that it is “possible
that experience with the EPs is leading to real change—in some cases, rapid change—in the culture of
banking organizations. In fact, it could be the case that the moral and ethical sensibilities of employees and
managers are being more deeply engaged by the reflective processes the EPs demand.”

3
The purpose of this thesis is to provide insight into these claims from the
Canadian perspective by documenting EPs adoption by Canadian banks as an illustration
of the practical effect of CSR in a particular context. This research will respond to calls
for further study into a fundamental question posed in the academic literature: why do
banks, as profit maximizing institutions, voluntarily agree to adopt and adhere to the
EPs?6 This apparent contradiction between corporate goals and corporate practices is
explored further with particular focus upon the interesting space the EPs occupy between
self-interested business motivations and CSR.7
At a higher level of abstraction, this thesis will also examine the role of the EPs as
a mode of governance in regulating banking conduct. Along these lines, there is an
emerging body of social science literature that considers the EPs in the context of
theoretical questions about CSR, voluntary codes of conduct, regulation, and

6

See e.g., Richard Macve and Xiaoli Chen, “The “equator principles”: a success for voluntary codes?”
(2010) 23 Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 890 [Macve and Chen] at 894-896. See also
Conley and Williams, supra note 5 at 547 (noting that the EPs provoke “many questions,” but pointing out
that it is still early days in their study of this area: “[w]hy have so many banks signed onto the EPs,
including banks that were not particularly exposed to the kinds of reputational risk that motivated some of
the early adopters? What predictions can we make about which banks will be vigorous implementers and
which will not? How will regional patterns of adoption affect the efficacy of the EPs as global regulation?
What implications are there for theories of corporate governance if industry-wide lending standards have
effects within individual corporations? And why do some banks appear to be adopting the spirit of the EPs
at a deeper level than others?” However the authors note that scholars are “at the start of a broader
investigation of these phenomena and have no definitive answers as yet. … Ultimately, we hope to be able
to address the questions of why the market has worked here to promote at least some degree of
responsibility, yet has failed in other banking contexts, and what we can learn from those differences.”).
7

See e.g., Olaf Weber, “Environmental Credit Risk Management in Banks and Financial Service
Institutions” (2012) 21 Business Strategy and the Environment 248 [Weber] at 249. In the context of the
interplay between profit motives and adoption of CSR principles in banking, Weber notes that the business
of banks is to “accept deposits and channel the capital into lending or investment activities. They are
intermediaries with an economic and channeling function.” As a result, Weber argues that banks are
“primarily concerned about the financial return of their activities in relation to the risk that has to be taken.
They often stress the trade-off between financial return and corporate sustainability rather than seeing a
win-win situation.”

4
developments in corporate governance.8 More specifically, scholars use the EPs as a
model to examine the voluntary action by banks as a form of corporate regulation. They
argue that by “constructing a kind of “bottom up” framework, but leaving the decision on
adoption as voluntary,” the EPs are an example of “soft law.”9 Similarly, scholars in this
area argue that, by voluntarily choosing to adopt the EPs, member banks have become de
facto “sustainability regulators,” acting in ways that can be characterized as both
responsible and sustainable.10
This research is needed and timely. There is no question that financial institutions
occupy a tenuous space in the hearts and minds of most people and banks in particular are
often thought of as profit hungry machines with little or no social conscience.11 The
recent financial crisis brought many of these issues to a boiling point, as the sector
generated significant public anger in response to the widely publicized and criticized
government bailouts in international financial systems. In the aftermath of the crisis, and
coupled with widely condemned compensation practices for financial executives, it is

8

See e.g., Deborah E. Rupp and Cynthia A. Williams, “The Efficacy of Regulation as a Function of
Psychological Fit: Reexamining the Hard Law/Soft Law Continuum” (2011) 12 Theoretical Inquiries in
Law 580 [Rupp and Williams] at 582-584; see also e.g., Conley and Williams, supra note 5 at 545 and 553555.
9

See e.g., Macve and Chen, supra note 6 at 891.

10

Conley and Williams, supra note 5 at 543. The authors note that “in one limited area of their operations,
project finance, where global banks kept risk on their own balance sheets and were actually exposed to
many types of risk usually dismissed as “externalities,” many joined an initiative whereby they agreed to
act in ways that can be labeled both responsible and sustainable.”
11

See Christopher C. Nicholls, Financial Institutions - The Regulatory Framework (Markham, ON:
LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2008) [Nicholls] at 1-3. Nicholls describes the tenuous nature of society’s
relationship with banks, noting that “the bank, after all, is the quintessential financial ‘institution,’ standing
at the center of the financial system in Canada and in most other industrialized countries. …” Despite the
important role played by financial institutions in the economy and society, however, Nicholls points out
that “engendering confidence does not necessarily engender affection. … Popular resentment of powerful
institutions and the well-paid people who run them is neither a new phenomenon nor a surprising one, and
the central role played by banks in our credit system has made them very powerful institutions indeed.”

5
possible that bankers may now be even more generally detested than lawyers, although it
remains a tight race.12
More recently, the financial sector has become a hot-bed of activity as
governments, regulators and academics work to understand the causes of the financial
crisis and to ensure the soundness of domestic and international banking systems.13 Some
legal commentators and scholars have also started to consider the financial crisis in the
context of CSR theory. Janda et al argue in their recent legal analysis of CSR, for
example, that the “causes of the financial crises, in fact had much to do with the lack of
sufficient progress in CSR.”14 Amongst the contributing factors to the financial crisis
they identified were a lack of transparency and accountability; a lack of minimum
standards and best practices; a lack of appropriate risk management; and a neglect of the
duties that financial institutions owe to society and the financial system. In short, they
argued, the financial crisis was caused in part at least by conduct that demonstrated the
“opposite of sensible CSR principles.”15

12

Ibid at 2. Nicholls notes that few professions (with the possible exception of the legal profession) have
been “more vilified than banking in popular literature, films and television.” This leads to an obvious
question: what might be said of banking lawyers?
13

A discussion of the causes of the financial crisis and the steps taken by international regulators in
response is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, for more information in this area, see the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision’s response to the financial crisis, available online:
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/fincriscomp.htm. The work in this area continues with respect to the “International
regulatory framework for banks (Basel III),” see online at: http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm.
14

Michael Kerr, Richard Janda and Chip Pitts, Corporate Social Responsibility - A Legal Analysis
(Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2009) [Janda et al] at 590. However, this view is not universally
held. Financial economists argue, for example, that the financial crisis was caused by structural problems in
domestic and international banking systems that had very little to do with the decision by banks to adopt (or
not) CSR. See e.g., Gary Gorton, “Getting Up to Speed on the Financial Crisis: A One-Weekend Reader’s
Guide (with A. Metrick)” (2012) 50 Journal of Economic Literature 128. Gorton states that the catalyst for
the near collapse of the international banking system was a relatively familiar concept: a “banking panic”
or “run on the bank.”
15

Ibid
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Against this backdrop, this thesis ultimately concludes that examples of CSR
behavior can now be observed as Canadian banks continue to define the scope of their
involvement with the EPs.16 However, this conclusion is tempered by the finding that
there is little doubt that pragmatic and self-interested business motivations are also
behind EPs adoption and implementation by Canadian banks. Any expectations that we
might one day arrive at “socially responsible” banks should therefore be tempered by the
reality that CSR remains in a state of flux as a business and legal concept and has yet to
gain universal implementation in Canadian banking.
Interestingly, as will be discussed in this thesis, these findings are also consistent
with broader themes identified in the scholarship in this area: the idea that adopting banks
see the EPs as “good for business” in that they use the principles in their own self-interest
to manage certain credit and reputational risks inherent in some of their lending activities.
Moreover, given these self-interested motivations, some banks have been heavily
criticized for lacking transparency and accountability in complying with the EPs’
requirements. Since no overt legal mechanism exists to monitor and enforce EPs
compliance, concerns about “free-riding” have now emerged as critics point out that all
adopters are likely to gain some reputational benefits irrespective of their actual
compliance practices.
As noted in this thesis, these criticisms demonstrate one of the key drawbacks of
voluntary CSR initiatives like the EPs: they may lack the necessary compliance and
enforcement measures to effectively promote and implement CSR. In particular, the
instant research shows that these observations are directly relevant in the Canadian
16

Conley and Williams used a similar backdrop for their paper on the EPs, noting that this “is an ironic
time to be writing about banks as possible global sustainability regulators, …” See Conley and Williams,
supra note 5 at 542.
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context as it finds that Canadian banks are using the EPs primarily for their important
reputational benefits. This thesis therefore concludes that Canadian banks need to do a
better job of promoting the transparency of their EPs reporting and compliance practices
in order to more fully implement the EPs, and to avoid being labeled with the free-rider
problem referred to above. Given the importance of many of these issues and the
significant power and influence of banks on the everyday lives of Canadians, this area of
analysis should remain as an important item on academic, regulatory, political and social
agendas.

1.2 Introduction to CSR
This thesis adopts a broad conception of CSR to mean the idea that “a corporation
must act in a responsible manner with regard to the environment, community and broader
society in which it operates.”17 This definition is chosen for its inclusiveness as this thesis
acknowledges that CSR means different things to different people and does not enjoy a
universally accepted definition.18 As discussed below, however, the lack of a unified
definition of CSR does not mean that it cannot (or should not) be studied as a concept.19
In this regard, the study of CSR necessarily reflects concerns about the proper conduct of

17

This is the definition of CSR endorsed by the late Hon. Mr. Justice Charles Doherty Gonthier, formerly
of the Supreme Court of Canada, in his forward to the text by Janda et al. See Janda et al, supra note 14.
18

See Chapter 2 of this thesis for a more detailed discussion of some of the legal, economic and business
theory related to CSR. The starting point for this analysis acknowledges that the academic relevance of
CSR remains hotly debated and controversial and that the concept itself does not have a universally
accepted definition.
19

The early development of CSR as a concept is said to have occurred primarily in business schools.
However, CSR scholars claim that there has now been a resurgence of CSR, with its prominence widened
to other disciplines, such as politics, economics, law and sociology. See e.g., Stephen Brammer, Gregory
Jackson and Dirk Matten “Corporate Social Responsibility and institutional theory: new perspectives on
private governance” (2012) 10 Socio-Economic Review 3 [Brammer et al] at 7.

8
business enterprise and there can be little doubt that this area of concern has occupied
philosophers, scholars, religious and political leaders and law-makers for centuries.20
More recently, these issues were brought to the forefront in the corporate law
context by the famous 1930s Harvard Law Review exchange between Professors Adolf
A. Berle Jr. of Columbia Law School and Merrick Dodd Jr. of Harvard. Professor Berle
espoused the idea that the primary duty of corporate directors is to use their powers only
to further the interests of shareholders.21 Professor Dodd, on the other hand, argued that
corporations should take into account the interests of other corporate stakeholders as well
– those of employees, consumers and the general public.22 Although the Berle-Dodd
exchange did not focus directly on CSR (the formal concept was not yet established),
these fundamental questions continue to dominate the academic discussion and debate in
this area.23 In this vein, CSR is also understood in this thesis to emphasize an approach to

20

See the discussion on this point by Jennifer A. Zerk, “Multinationals and Corporate Social
Responsibility: Limitations and Opportunities in International Law” (Cambridge University Press, 2006)
[Zerk] at 15.
21

Adolf A. Berle Jr., “Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust” (1931) 44 Harvard Law Review 1049 [Berle].
Berle’s thesis was that “all powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a corporation, or to
any group within a corporation, whether derived from statute or charter or both, are necessarily and at all
times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears.” As Berle
explained in later articles in the Columbia Law Review, his principal concern was that directors were not
really qualified for the task of serving non-shareholder interests and, as he noted in the original paper, a
multi-stakeholder model raises accountability issues. See ““Control” in Corporate Law” (1958) 58 Colum.
L. Rev. 1212[Berle-Control], and “Modern Functions of the Corporate System” (1962) 62 Colum. L. Rev.
433.
22

E. Merrick Dodd Jr., “For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?” (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review
1145 [Dodd]. Dodd viewed as problematic the idea that business corporations exist for the sole purpose of
making profits for their shareholders. He advocated instead for a view of the “business corporation as an
economic institution which has a social service as well as a profit-making function …”
23

See e.g., Archie B. Carroll and Kareem M. Shabana, “The Business Case for Corporate Social
Responsibility: A Review of Concepts, Research and Practice” (2010) International Journal of Management
Reviews 85 [Carroll and Shabana] at 86-87. The authors note that the roots of the formal concept of CSR
emerged sometime after the Berle-Dodd exchange during the period 1945–1960. In particular, they
reference Dean Donald K. David’s comments to the incoming MBA class at the Harvard Business School
in 1946 wherein Dean David “exhorted the future business executives to take heed of the responsibilities
that had come to rest on the shoulders of business leaders.”
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corporate governance that “integrates and balances the self-interests of the corporation
with the interests of the public” such that the “role of the corporation goes beyond
providing individual benefits to its shareholders; it also includes a responsibility towards
a wider community.”24 As discussed in further detail in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the
primary importance of earning economic returns from business activities is recognized
under this model, with the idea being that corporations can also be asked to “do more.”
From a legal perspective, for example, CSR is often understood to mean “doing more
than what is required by law, i.e. beyond legal compliance.”25
As will be shown in Chapter 2, however, any claim about the merits of CSR must
be considered in light of the fact that CSR remains in a state of flux and is not universally
accepted. This is particularly true in economics and corporate law circles where scholars
24

This is the second part of the definition of CSR endorsed by Justice Gonthier in his forward to Janda et
al. See Janda et al, supra note 14.
25

Karin Buhmann “Corporate Social Responsibility: what role for law? Some aspects for law and CSR”
(2006) 6 Corporate Governance 188 at 189. As discussed in Section 2.2 of this thesis, however, there are
difficulties associated with this “balancing” of profits with CSR approach. For example, it assumes that
there is some knowable, objective “reasonable” amount of profitability that can be balanced against a
corporation’s other social interests. Questions therefore arise regarding the point at which a particular
business can be said to have achieved the base measure of profitability which then subjects it to the
expectation that it should now “do more.”
For a practical example of the idea that businesses should “do more” in the banking context, see the recent
coverage of the statement by Royal Bank of Canada’s CEO Gord Nixon on his bank’s response to the
temporary foreign workers controversy, available online at:
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2013/04/11/rbc-gord-nixon-apology-letter.html.
“The recent debate about an outsourcing arrangement for some technology services has
raised important questions.
While we are compliant with the regulations, the debate has been about something else.
The question for many people is not about doing only what the rules require - it’s about
doing what employees, clients, shareholders and Canadians expect of RBC. And that’s
something we take very much to heart.
…
[w]e are reviewing our supplier arrangements and policies with a continued focus on
Canadian jobs and prosperity, balancing our desire to be both a successful business and a
leading corporate citizen.”

10
continue to be heavily critical of CSR because it does not correspond with their views of
the role of business in society. As will be discussed, CSR is largely irrelevant (and
possibly even harmful) under these positions because the only social obligation of
business is to contribute to the wealth of society.26
The purpose of this thesis is not, however, to support or reject the classical
economic or corporate law views as they relate to CSR. Rather, as noted above, this
thesis proceeds on the basis that CSR values27 may now be observed in modern corporate
practice, and argues that the EPs offer a workable practical model for study in the
banking context because they not only demonstrate CSR but also are good for business.28
As a result, this research argues that the EPs offer a practical example of the “business
case” approach to CSR discussed in further detail in Chapter 2.29 As will be discussed,

26

See Section 2.2(a) of this thesis for a discussion of the classical economic and corporate law views.

27

A discussion of the normative underpinnings for CSR is beyond the scope this thesis. However, the
reference to CSR “values” here is to the general idea that businesses have a responsibility “to do what is
right, just, and fair, and to avoid or minimize harm to stakeholders (employees, consumers, the
environment, and others).” See Archie B. Carroll, “The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility:
Toward the Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders” (1991) 34 Business Horizons 39 [CarrollPyramid] at 42.
28

This pragmatic approach to the analysis in this area is adopted by some business lawyers. See e.g., the
2005 study “Banking on Responsibility” by U.K. law firm Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP
[Freshfields] at 42. Freshfields notes that “it is important not to see making profits and protecting society as
well as the environment as diametrically opposed. Progress can be made by agreeing on how to balance the
need to generate profits against the need to protect the environment and society.” A copy of this study is
available online at:
http://www.banktrack.org/manage/ems_files/download/banking_on_responsibility/050701_banking_on_res
ponsibility.pdf. Semotiuk adopted a similar approach for her LLM thesis on the role of corporate law in
CSR. See Orysia Semotiuk, “The role of law in corporate social responsibility and stakeholder theory”
Queen’s University (2004) ProQuest Dissertations and Thesis [Semotiuk] at 1-2.
29

As discussed in Chapter 2, however, it is important to point out that the business case approach is not
universally accepted and significant debate continues on whether CSR in this form fits into other theories
of the firm. The classical economic view, for example, may continue to reject CSR in principle and doubt
the value-creating contribution of CSR activities. See Section 2.3 of this thesis for further discussion on this
point.
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the focus of the business case approach is on the argument that CSR can be integrated
with financial management to create sustainable companies in the long-run.30

1.3 Thesis Organization and Methodology
This thesis is divided into 7 Chapters and utilizes multiple lines of doctrinal
resources and extrinsic evidence, including bank public disclosures, law firm articles and
various domestic and international research reports relevant to the banking industry. The
remainder of this Chapter 1 provides a brief description of Canadian Schedule 1 banks as
the population under study and then sets out some of the limitations of the methodology
used.
Chapter 2 provides a brief update on developments in CSR theory and the primary
research method is doctrinal. The intention is not to cover the extensive body of CSR
related scholarship but, rather, to provide a briefing on developments in this area that are
most relevant to the instant research. Some of the conceptual challenges advanced against
CSR will be briefly discussed; however, the purpose of Chapter 2 is ultimately to show
that the lack of a unified understanding of CSR does not mean that it cannot be studied as
a legitimate academic concept. In particular, recent scholarship has identified common
themes or approaches to CSR, including the “instrumentalist” approach that is most
relevant to the instant research. This, in turn, leads into a discussion of the “business
case” for CSR and other related theories including the “enlightened self-interest” and
“enlightened shareholder” theories. Finally, Chapter 2 reviews recent commentary to
make the argument that CSR is often misunderstood as a concept because of changes in

30

Ibid
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the so-called “voluntary” versus “mandatory” (e.g. imposed by law or regulation)
corporate conduct debate. As will be shown, this distinction is no longer as important as
once thought as CSR activity is now understood to exist in a wide range of both voluntary
and mandatory corporate behavior.
Moving away from the ongoing academic debate surrounding CSR, Chapter 3
makes the case for the practical relevance of CSR in Canada generally and in the
Canadian financial services industry specifically. The purpose is to set the stage for the
remainder of this thesis by arguing that, the lack of a universally accepted theoretical
model notwithstanding, the emergence of CSR is now a phenomenon that can be
observed in practice in Canada. The methodology here includes a review of examples of
CSR in the Canadian context to show that CSR has gained a strong foothold in practice in
this country. Doctrinal sources are also considered to show that general CSR principles
can now be connected to developments in the Canadian financial sector. As noted above,
the financial sector is viewed as increasingly relevant to CSR and some commentators
claim that a shift is occurring toward greater importance being placed on social and
environmental values in this industry. However, despite these developments and early
“wins” for CSR, Chapter 3 concludes that significant work remains to be done to advance
CSR in Canada and, in particular, the Canadian financial sector.
Chapter 4 begins the thesis’s case study by introducing the EPs. As noted above,
the EPs were chosen for study because they represent a potential example of CSR in
practice: a series of voluntary guidelines that banks have committed to follow in
managing the social and environmental risks of their project financing activities. A brief
overview of the EPs is provided, along with a description of the requirements they
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currently prescribe for member banks generally. Chapter 4 also discusses some of the
events that occurred on the international project financing stage leading up to the
development of the EPs in 2003. These developments are interesting because they show
that reputation risk management was a strong motivating factor behind the development
of the EPs in the aftermath of significant public relations scandals for member banks. In
particular, the fallout from the private sector financing of the Three Gorges Dam Project
in the People’s Republic of China is discussed.
Chapter 5 provides a literature review of the EPs related scholarship that has
emerged to-date. It considers a fundamental question posed in the academic work in this
area: why did banks and other profit maximizing financial institutions voluntarily
develop and adopt a code like the EPs? A review of several papers that have addressed
this apparent contradiction shows that scholars agree that pragmatic motivations are
behind EPs adoption as member banks see them as good for business. The second part of
Chapter 5 provides a review of the theoretical CSR framework developed for the EPs. As
noted above, it is generally well accepted in this scholarship that the principles amount to
a voluntary code, thereby evidencing an example of the form of global regulation known
as “soft law.” Finally, Chapter 5 canvasses some of the concerns associated with the EPs
compliance practices of member banks and the so-called “free-rider” problem that has
emerged in this context.
Chapter 6 considers the practical relevance of the EPs in Canadian banking and
the methodology shifts to a market based analysis of the EPs related public disclosure of
key Canadian banks. The emerging role of the EPs in Canada is assessed, along with a
consideration of how far (if at all) the EPs have become embedded in the Canadian
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banking industry. This methodology is adopted from a recent study by Macve and Chen
of EPs disclosures by banks in the U.K.31 The authors note in their paper that the EPs
provide an interesting arena in which to analyze how banks are implementing CSR but
pointed out that there remains a need for further research to investigate actual bank
practices and how this varies over time.32 The instant research will respond to this call for
further study from the Canadian perspective by considering the following questions:
1. What are the motivations for adopting and adhering to the EPs in Canada?
2. Are Canadian banks’ EPs disclosures adequate and credible?
3. How far have the EPs become embedded in Canadian banking?
In conclusion, Chapter 7 sets out some of the general observations that can be
made on the basis of this research and the case study on the adoption of the EPs in
Canada. As a first point, Chapter 7 concludes that the results of this study provide support
for the proposition that Canadian banks are demonstrating CSR behavior through the
steps they are taking to implement and comply with the EPs: each of the Canadian banks
studied has made broad public statements concerning the importance of CSR and point to
their adoption of the EPs as evidence of their commitment in this regard. As a result,
there can be little doubt that a practical shift of business and financial values is occurring
leading toward greater importance being attributed to CSR considerations in the
Canadian banking sector.
However, this conclusion is ultimately tempered by the finding that Canadian
banks are using the EPs primarily for self-interested reasons. As discussed in this thesis,

31

Macve and Chen, supra note 6.

32

Ibid at 894-896.

15
this is not necessarily inconsistent with CSR to the extent that the business case for CSR
contemplates self-interested business motivations as being a primary driver of corporate
activity.33 However, the business case for CSR also requires that consideration be given
to environmental and social concerns and this study found no evidence of positive
environmental or social outcomes in the EPs reporting of Canadian banks. In fact, this
study found that the limited EPs reporting and disclosure by Canadian banks makes it
impossible to draw any conclusions in this area. As a result, this thesis concludes that
there is clearly room for improvement for Canadian banks, particularly in the areas of
EPs disclosure and compliance practices, and further study will be needed to see if
Canadian banks are mindful of these concerns as they move forward in their
implementation of the principles.
Moreover, Chapter 7 concludes that while the case study conducted here shows
that the emergence of CSR behavior can be observed in Canadian banking, it also shows
that many of the theoretical problems associated with CSR emerge when it is put into
practice in this industry. As result, significant work remains to be done to advance CSR
in financial services and even more work will be needed to see if it works in practice in
the Canadian banking sector. Beyond Canada, Chapter 7 also identifies that further study
is needed into the impact of the EPs on the international banking industry. For example,
as geopolitical shifts are taking place, it will become increasingly important to understand
the extent to which banks from emerging market economies are adopting the EPs.
Finally, Chapter 7 identifies that there will be significant opportunity for further
study in this area when the on-going EPs update process is implemented in 2013 and
2014. A draft of the new principles was released for stakeholder consultation and public
33
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comment on August 13, 2012 and the formal comment period closed on October 12,
2012. The updated principles were formally launched and are effective from June 4,
2013, but there is a transition period in place to allow banks to continue using the current
version of the EPs until the end of 2013. Although banks have made a number of
commitments to make improvements during the update process, some commentators and
NGOs are highly critical of the efforts taken in this regard to date. BankTrack in
particular has indicated its frustration on these issues and has demanded firm
commitments from the banks; failing which, it argues the updated principles will have
failed to achieve any meaningful improvements.34

1.4 Population under Study: Schedule 1 Canadian Banks
All banks operating in Canada are subject to the regulation and supervision of the
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI).35 According to the
Canadian Bankers Association, the banking industry in Canada currently includes “24
domestic banks, 25 foreign bank subsidiaries, 24 full-service foreign bank branches and
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five foreign bank lending branches operating in Canada.”36 The CBA provides the
following information relating to the breakdown of banks in Canada:
Schedule I Banks are Canadian banks and are authorized by OSFI under the
Bank Act37 to accept deposits, which may be eligible for deposit insurance
provided by the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation;
Schedule II banks are foreign bank subsidiaries authorized to accept deposits,
which may be eligible for deposit insurance;
Schedule III banks are bank branches of foreign institutions that are
authorized to do some specific form of banking business in Canada. Certain
restrictions are placed on their activities (e.g. they may not be eligible to take
deposits); and
Most Schedule II and Schedule III banks specialize in certain niche financing
sectors and have only one or two offices or branches located within Canada.38
The focus of this thesis is on Schedule 1 banks as representing the largest portion
of the Canadian financial banking industry. More specifically, this thesis focuses on
Canada’s five largest domestic banks (referred to in this thesis as the “Big-5” Canadian
banks): Royal Bank of Canada, Toronto-Dominion Bank, Bank of Nova Scotia, Bank of
Montreal and the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce. Together, the Big-5 Canadian
banks are taken as representative of the Canadian banking industry for the purposes of
this thesis as they hold over 80 percent of total banking assets in Canada: OSFI confirms
36
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this relative importance of the Big-5 Canadian banks in the following graph:39

1.5 Research Limitations
The following limitations in the methodology have been identified for this thesis,
each of which could form the opportunity for further study in this area. First, this research
presupposes that the emergence of CSR in banking is something that can be observed.
However, as will be noted in Chapter 2 of this thesis, there is no definitive agreement in
the academic literature on what constitutes CSR and whether or not observed corporate
conduct falls into a conception of what is socially responsible depends on the context and
is open to interpretation. It is therefore difficult to measure in any meaningful sense. As
noted above, however, it is relatively early days in the study of the implications of CSR
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for the banking industry40 and the purpose here is only to use a broadly defined
understanding of CSR to document the emergence of a range of activities in Canadian
banking that appear to be socially responsible. The goal is to support further theoretical
and practical research into a model of CSR that is relevant to the banking sector and
further research will be needed to measure whether and how banks are being socially
responsible in any quantifiable way.
A second and related limitation is that this research also presupposes that the
emergence of social type duties in the banking sector can be attributed to CSR. In this
regard, however, since there is no agreed upon definition of CSR, it is difficult to state
with certainty that any of the behaviors discussed in this thesis are directly caused by the
promulgation of CSR principles. Some of the implications of this are discussed in
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 where it is noted that banks are likely incentivized to adopt the EPs
by competitive pressures and self-interested motivations rather than strict adherence to
CSR. However, as noted above, the overall purpose of this thesis is simply to make an
initial connection between CSR and observed practices in the Canadian banking sector;
further study will be needed to determine the strength of the connection, or whether there
may be other causal factors at play.
This thesis is also limited to a discussion of CSR and does not purport to cover the
entire range of corporate conduct models developed in the areas of law and business, as
well as other disciplines, such as, politics, economics, sociology and philosophy. This
approach is justifiable given that it is consistent with statements by scholars who confirm
that CSR remains the “dominant, if not exclusive, term in the academic literature and
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business practice.”41 However, further study would be needed to determine if and how
the results of this thesis might support other theories in this area. For example, this
research might also align with stakeholder theory, which is understood to be closely
related to CSR. A full discussion of stakeholder theory is beyond the scope of this thesis
but, generally speaking, it holds that corporations should take into account the
considerations of other persons that impact or may be impacted by corporate actions.42
Finally, this thesis is obviously limited in terms of its geographic application to
Canada. Further, the population under study is again limited to the Big-5 Canadian banks
listed under Schedule 1 of the Bank Act. Although this is justifiable given the weighting
of the Big-5 Canadian banks in Canada’s banking sector (see Section 1.4 above), the
research will be limited in that it may not consider emerging issues in other areas of the
Canadian and international financial industries. As discussed in Chapter 7, further
research will be needed to see whether some of the findings of this thesis can be applied
more generally across the larger body of what we consider to be financial institutions in
Canada and internationally.
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CHAPTER 2 – UPDATE ON CSR
2.1 Introduction
This Chapter provides a brief update on recent CSR related scholarship. The body
of work that makes up the academic literature on CSR is extensive and a full review is
beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, this Chapter focuses on CSR developments that
are relevant to the instant research and, in particular, the recent legal scholarship in this
area advanced by Janda et al in Corporate Social Responsibility - A Legal Analysis.43
The remainder of this Chapter is divided into 3 parts. Section 2.2 provides a
discussion of some of the conceptual challenges that have contributed to the lack of a
formal unified definition of CSR. In particular, the criticisms of CSR advanced on the
basis of the classical economic view and corporate law are discussed.
Section 2.3 then turns the analysis to a potential middle ground in the CSR debate
- the “business case” for CSR - that has been developed at least partly in response to the
challenges advanced by scholars espousing the classical economic view. As will be
discussed, this thesis argues that the EPs offer a chance to study the business case
approach because the principles evidence CSR values and are also good for business.
Finally, Section 2.4 makes the argument that CSR is also often misunderstood as
a concept because of changes to the so-called “voluntary” versus “mandatory” (e.g.
imposed by law or regulation) corporate conduct debate. As will be shown, this issue is
no longer as important as once thought as CSR activity is now believed to exist within a
range of both voluntary and mandatory corporate behavior.
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2.2 Update on CSR Theory
(a) Conceptual Challenges
This analysis starts from the position that there is no universally accepted
definition of CSR.44 In a general sense, it is probably accurate today to say that the
concept of CSR clearly “means something” but, as will be shown below, it does “not
always mean the same thing to everybody.”45 This is confirmed by Janda et al in the legal
context as the authors conclude that there is no single “legal definition” of CSR.46
However, although CSR is often criticized on this point as being theoretically
problematic, Janda et al argue that the absence of a definition is, in fact, purposeful: CSR
needs to remain “conceptually flexible in order to foster on-going evolution and
development” and any legal understanding must therefore be directed at a moving
target.47 They point out that what is socially responsible in any given context depends on
changing social needs and concerns, and these cannot be confined to current standards.
As a result, CSR is necessarily a dynamic concept that remains “in a constant state of
evolution and, arguably, should never be subject to a fixed, universal definition.”48
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As noted in the introduction to this thesis, one of the main conceptual difficulties
in defining and understanding CSR arises in the literature because of disagreement over
the nature of the corporation and its role in society. In this regard, it can be argued that
the typical focal point of the CSR debate is the “inquiry into what obligations
corporations owe to society” and this can be thought of as a debate about the nature or
purpose of the corporation or, stated another way, “any view of CSR conceals complex
normative conclusions about the nature of the corporation.”49
In this regard, a detailed discussion about the highly complex nature of CSR and
its controversial underpinnings is beyond the scope of this thesis. In a very general sense,
however, the scholarship identifies two different but related theoretical models for CSR:
“rights approaches and power models.”50 Rights approaches typically center on
arguments that corporations and society engage in a form of “social contract,” also
referred to as a “social compact.”51 CSR scholars point out, for example, that the
corporation has “always been a political creation” in that “the state granted the
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corporation the benefit of limited liability in order to facilitate the accumulation of
capital.”52 As a result, Brammer et al argue on this point that
“[t]his extension of limited liability created a fundamental issue of
corporate governance. But it is not simply a matter of how managers are to
be made accountable to the more diffuse group of shareholders as agency
theory tells us, but a more fundamental issue of what responsibilities
society places on the corporation itself in exchange for the legal privilege
of limited liability.”53
Similarly, as a starting point, for their discussion, Janda et al point out that the
social contract or compact conception of CSR holds that in
“exchange for public trust and the social license to operate its business,
the corporation makes a series of social business commitments or
reciprocal undertakings. According to this understanding, the corporation
cannot exist without its social setting and therefore makes undertakings to
preserve and enhance the very social setting that has made its existence
possible.”54
Other prominent Canadian authors have commented positively on this social
contract theory as well. For example, Hutchinson refers to a “democratic wager” being
made:
“[i]f particular individuals wish to avail themselves of the many benefits
of incorporation (the most important of which is limited liability), it seems
entirely fair and appropriate that they assume a reciprocal series of public
responsibilities and forgo their almost unlimited control over the
corporation’s organization and operations… .”55
In addition to rights approaches, scholars argue that there are at least four power
models in this area, including the power-responsibility model; the bureaucratic
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responsibility model; the mutual interest model and the power-legitimacy model.56
Generally speaking, power issues become relevant here to the extent that “[p]ower over
the lives of others tends to create on the part of those most worthy to exercise it a sense of
responsibility.”57 For example, under the power-legitimacy model, concerns about a
corporation’s power legitimacy arise in the context of “examining questions of the
legitimacy of corporate power within modern society; both in the sense of power being
exercised legitimately and in the sense, of having legitimacy for the exercise of such
power.”58
However, economists and corporate law scholars typically reject the rights and
power model approaches to argue that CSR is largely irrelevant (and possibly even
harmful) to the extent that it is inconsistent with their own views on the role of business
in society.59 The classical economic view holds, for example, that corporations contribute
to the wealth and well-being of society by earning a profit and, as a result, the pursuit of
economic goals becomes the only corporate social responsibility of business. This was
perhaps most famously stated by Milton Friedman in his 1970 article in the New York
Times wherein he argued that “there is one and only one social responsibility of business-to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it
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stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition
without deception or fraud.”60
From this economic perspective, it can be argued that the common good of
society will be furthered by “the self-interested actions of individual economic agents in a
market economy, including in particular the actions of business enterprises guided by the
profit motive ... .”61 As a result, under this view, economists see “profitability as a prima
facie indicator of changes in general welfare: this is their starting point.”62 CSR could in
fact be dangerous to the extent that the actions of companies are taken beyond profit
motives, thereby worsening economic performance and making society and people in
general worse off.63
Traditional corporate law theory gives a similar but less clear cut conclusion. It
holds that corporate directors have a duty to act in accordance with the best interests of
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the shareholders of the corporation.64 To the extent that shareholders wish the corporation
to “make as much money as possible,” it can be argued that corporate law facilitates
wealth creation when corporations pursue economic returns for their shareholders within
the rules imposed by law.65 Former Chancellor William T. Allen put it this way:
“[s]tated broadly, but I think accurately, the elemental purpose of
corporate law is the facilitation of cooperative activity that produces
wealth. A net increase in total wealth, other things remaining unchanged,
is an absolute good. With increased wealth, all other things remaining the
same, there is a great ability to relieve human suffering and enhance
life.”66
As a result, scholars in this area argue that conclusions about CSR are the same
under both classical economics and traditional corporate law:
“Since both give pre-eminence to shareholders, they are cool towards the
idea, now widely accepted, that power or status should be conferred,
whether by law or corporate decisions, on other ‘stakeholders’ in a
business. Both believe that companies will best discharge the
responsibilities which specifically belong to them by taking profitability as
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a guide, subject always to acting within the law, and that they should not
go out of their way to define and promote wider self-chosen objectives.”67

(b) CSR as a Concept
Due in part at least to the theoretical differences described above, we are left with
CSR today as what can only be described as an ill-defined and often misunderstood
concept.68 In fact, CSR continues to be criticized on this point as being unrealistic and
lacking in academic legitimacy.69 However, these criticisms often represent an
oversimplified understanding of CSR and ignore the fact that scholars from several
disciplines have devoted significant effort toward the development of CSR into a
workable theoretical concept.70
Further, significant scholarly work in this area continues as efforts today focus on
key features of CSR that can be readily identified and understood.71 Scholars point out,
for example, that the field of CSR has “grown significantly and today contains a great
proliferation of theories, approaches and terminologies.”72 More specifically, in their
recent attempt to “map” this proliferation of CSR in the academic literature, Garriga and
Mele point out that “the most relevant CSR theories and related approaches are focused
on one of the following aspects of social reality: economics, politics, social integration
67
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and ethics.”73 Based on this work, Garriga and Mele conclude that most current CSR
theories are focused on the following four key aspects:
1. instrumental in the sense of creating long-term value for
companies,
2. political in the sense of using business power responsibly,
3. integrative in the sense of integrating business and social
demands, and
4. contributive in the sense of creating value for society by
doing what is ethically correct.74
This thesis aligns with the “instrumentalist” approach in that it argues that the EPs
represent a potential example of the merger of CSR values with the economic reality of
firms. In this regard, Archie B. Carroll is credited with having developed a multi-layer
conception or “pyramid” model of CSR that consists of four interrelated aspects: a
corporation’s economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic responsibilities.75 Importantly,
Carroll recognized that the economic responsibility to “provide goods and services” to
society was paramount because all “other business responsibilities are predicated upon
the economic responsibility of the firm, because without it the others become moot
considerations.”76 Based on this, Carroll articulated a pyramid of CSR that contains the
four components he identified:
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“[b]eginning with the basic building block notion that
economic performance undergirds all else. At the same
time, business is expected to obey the law because the law
is society's codification of acceptable and unacceptable
behavior. Next is business’s responsibility to be ethical. At
its most fundamental level, this is the obligation to do what
is right, just, and fair, and to avoid or minimize harm to
stakeholders (employees, consumers, the environment, and
others). Finally, business is expected to be a good corporate
citizen. This is captured in the philanthropic responsibility,
wherein business is expected to contribute financial and
human resources to the community and to improve the
quality of life.”77
Stated in more pragmatic terms, Carroll argued that “the CSR firm should strive
to make a profit, obey the law, be ethical, and be a good corporate citizen.”78 However,
Carroll recognized that this model was imperfect and subject to criticism on the basis that
there are inherent “tensions” between a corporation’s responsibilities. Carroll conceded
that the most critical tensions would be between the economic and legal, economic and
ethical, and economic and philanthropic responsibilities, and that the economic
traditionalist might see this as a conflict between a firm’s “concern for profits” versus its
“concern for society.” Carroll suggested, however, that this objection amounted to an
oversimplification because a CSR perspective “would recognize these tensions as
organizational realities, but focus on the total pyramid as a unified whole and how the
firm might engage in decisions, actions, and programs that simultaneously fulfill all its
component parts.”79
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2.3 The Business Case for CSR
Today, the economic rationale for CSR is often discussed in terms of the
“business case” for CSR.80 Janda et al point out, for example, that a common theme is
one of “integration of economic considerations, as the traditional focus of business, with
environmental and social imperatives.”81 In short, this school of thought holds that
“companies need to be ‘socially responsible’ to fulfill their obligations to shareholders.”82
Stated more broadly, the business case for CSR “refers to the arguments or rationales
supporting or documenting why the business community should accept and advance the
CSR ‘cause’” and the primary question becomes “[w]hat do the business community and
organizations get out of CSR; that is, how do they benefit tangibly from engaging in CSR
policies, activities and practices?”83
However, it is important to point out that the business case approach is not
universally accepted and significant debate continues on whether CSR in this form fits
into economic theory.84 Moreover, on the issue of firm profitability, it is important to
note that, despite significant and on-going academic work, the practical connection
between CSR and short-term financial performance has not been fully established. As a
result, commentators conclude that continued work in this area is needed as academics
remain skeptical and some find that “the theoretical arguments as well as the empirical
evidence so far are rather poor. Financial performance is only weakly linked to corporate
80
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socially responsible behavior; many papers even find a negative relationship between the
two.”85
On the other hand, CSR scholars point out that the focus of the business case for
CSR is on long-term rather than short-term performance. Carroll and Shabana argue, for
example, that this version of CSR may not be inconsistent with the classical economic
view to the extent that:
“[t]he notion of an economic responsibility in terms of financial profit to
stockholders is accepted and required by both views. One may even argue
that maximizing shareholder wealth in the long run is an underlying
principle of both views. The real difference may be that the classical
economic view fails to appreciate the long-term negative effects of the
application of the maximization principle in the short term. In contrast, the
opposite view applies the maximization principle for long-term benefits,
which entails that such principle may be suppressed in certain short-term
considerations.”86
It can be argued generally in this context that one of the “main drivers” of the
business case for CSR arises because companies may already be aware that there are
long-term gains to be made by adhering to CSR.87 For example, Carroll and Shabana
have now identified that the business case is understood to include four different subgroupings based on the “value creation focus” of the approach:
1. cost and risk reduction;
2. gaining competitive advantage;
3. developing reputation and legitimacy; and
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4. seeking win–win outcomes through synergistic value creation.88
Based on these developments, scholars note that the business case for CSR should
be more palatable to classical economists and corporate law scholars because of the way
that it fuses “economic and moral considerations” in a “utilitarian rather than an idealistic
or altruistic discourse.”89 For example, Macve and Chen argue in this context that the
business case does not per se conflict with a primary objective of serving shareholders, as
required under traditional corporate law models.90 Similarly, Okoye points out that the
business case is “not inconsistent” with the theories of the firm to the extent that “certain
social activities may contribute to the long-term shareholder value of the corporation.”91
In any event, CSR scholars argue that the business case approach ultimately helps
to frame the debate as it emerged in response to Milton Friedman and the classical
economist view that businesses must focus only on maximizing profits. On this point
Carroll and Shabana state that “[i]f it could be demonstrated that businesses actually
benefited financially from CSR, then possibly Friedman’s arguments would somewhat be
neutralized.” 92 Moreover, it can be argued from a practical perspective that, the
inconclusive results regarding short-term profitability notwithstanding, the business case
version of CSR holds “firm ground in the commonsense of the field” as “consultancies,
88
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auditing firms, SRIs, and CSR indices routinely invoke the business case in general and
its value as a risk-management device in particular in order to ground CSR in the
universe of an expert legitimated rational order.”93
Support for the long-term approach to the business case for CSR can also be
found in the ethical context as a form of “enlightened self-interest theory.” This theory
holds that persons who act to further the interests of others ultimately serve their own
interest.94 In this way, enlightened self-interest is used as an important argument in favor
CSR: “the belief that it is in business’s long-term self-interest – enlightened self-interest
– to be socially responsible. If business is to have a healthy climate in which to function
in the future, it must take actions now that will ensure its long-term viability.”95 Janda et
al argue, for example, that CSR may serve the self-interests of corporations in ways that
may not necessarily be reflected in short-term profit: cost savings and increased
efficiency (through, for example, energy savings and reduction of employee
absenteeism); improved risk management; improved employee recruitment and retention;
and building corporate brand and attracting customers.96
Another closely related concept is “enlightened shareholder theory.” This
approach to CSR encourages “cooperative inclusive relationships” between the
shareholders and those affected (e.g. stakeholders) only when there is an economic case
for it.97 Macve and Chen argue, for example, that
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“[i]n between the traditional “shareholder value maximization” theory
which argues for the shareholders’ interests exclusively, and “stakeholder”
theories, which call for a fair consideration of all parties for their own
sakes, enlightened shareholder theory has been promoted both as the most
theoretically defensible and as the most practical corporate goal in the
modern business world, where it is generally labeled as “the business
case” for CSR.”98
They point out that a real world example of this theory may now be found in the
recent addition of section 172 to the U.K. Companies Act 2006,99 which, they argue,
“imposes a duty on directors to ‘have regard’ to other stakeholder interests – in particular
of the employees, the community and the environment – and to any long-term
consequences of their decisions,” but only within “their pursuit of the primary objective
“to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members [i.e. shareholders]
as a whole.””100

2.4 Debunking the Voluntary vs. Mandatory Debate
The lack of a unified definition of CSR may also be attributed to the fact that the
line between voluntary and mandatory corporate conduct is no longer as clear as once
thought. It is true that CSR was initially understood in terms of voluntary corporate
action, and that the emphasis on voluntary approaches was the primary focus of CSR at
the turn of the millennium.101 However, Janda et al point out that CSR is now understood
in wider terms to include both voluntary and mandatory corporate behavior and
interactions with a variety of internal and external stakeholders and constituencies
98
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(employees, customers, regulators and society).102 As a result, CSR commentators are
increasingly recognizing that the debate between voluntary and mandatory conduct is
misguided: voluntary and mandatory approaches may now overlap to form a variety of
approaches to CSR.103
Despite this, it is still useful to understand why the voluntary versus mandatory
debate was important and why it no longer applies. Commentators note that part of the
confusion in this area is caused by the fact that different definitions of CSR are typically
presented with different political, social and corporate agendas in mind.104 For example,
they note that businesses themselves may seek to avoid mandatory regulation by
emphasizing the importance of voluntary initiatives, arguing that only voluntary
corporate conduct amounts to CSR.105 More generally, commentators have identified a
number of conceptual benefits associated with voluntary initiatives from a regulatory
perspective: they place responsibility at the corporate level where the available
information and ability to impact outcomes may be maximized; they may be more
flexible and easy to implement than mandatory regulation; they can be less costly than
regulation; and, in theory at least, voluntary initiatives may lead to higher levels of
corporate compliance with the requirements.106
Despite this, commentators point out that there are also a number of drawbacks
associated with voluntary approaches. For example, voluntary initiatives are typically
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non-binding in nature and may not be enough to achieve responsible corporate conduct in
practice.107 In this regard, an often-cited 2003 study by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) found that voluntary initiatives typically do not
result in improvements beyond the outcomes expected without them.108 Commentators
also note that business may support voluntary initiatives precisely because they can be
used to argue against the adoption of formal laws. This is a drawback to the extent that it
may ultimately serve to prevent regulatory action that is needed to address social or
environmental concerns.109
The mandatory versus voluntary debate can also be framed in terms of “command
and control regulation” versus “self-regulation.” Command and control regulation refers
to the imposition of regulatory requirements, backed up by sanctions and other
enforcement mechanisms.110 Self-regulation refers to regulatory schemes organized and
adopted by individual companies, or their trade associations or professional bodies. As is
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the case with the EPs, this typically involves a requirement for members to adhere to
some form of voluntary code or framework of rules.111
Like the mandatory versus voluntary debate, however, the line between command
and control and self-regulation is not always clear and, in any event, there are several
drawbacks associated with mandatory regulatory initiatives. For example, one of the
main problems is that, in certain contexts, this style of regulation may be ineffective to
the extent that it is less tailored to industry needs and less responsive to quickly evolving
situations.112 Further, this imprecision and lack of flexibility may, in some cases, inspire
“a race to the bottom” making legal compliance little more than a “box-ticking”
exercise.113
More broadly, commentators note that insistence on regulatory initiatives may
also reflect an overly simplistic view of the law and how it guides corporate behavior.114
They note that it is uncontroversial to say that few regulatory regimes are bullet-proof
such that significant grey areas exist regarding how any specific law should be
interpreted and followed.115 As a result, they argue that companies may be able to
determine their own substantive compliance with technical regulatory standards.116
Moreover, commentators note that some corporations might even see non-compliance
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with a regulation as efficient on a pure cost/benefit analysis.117 Ultimately, however, they
point out that the existence of a legal loophole should not be the only determining factor:
a responsible corporation would seek to comply with the spirit of the law rather than
trying to find ways around it.118
As a result, like the mandatory versus voluntary debate, commentators now
recognize that the command and control versus self-regulation debate is misguided for
several reasons. They advocate for a broader understanding of regulation which
recognizes that rules may not have to be legally binding and enforceable to be
effective.119 Also, commentators argue that, although many CSR-related issues are
already heavily regulated, for example, in areas of work place health and safety,
environment and consumer protection, voluntary initiatives in these areas may ultimately
have an impact by shaping the background against which companies operate.120
Finally, commentators note that some governments and regulators are
increasingly recognizing that effective regulation involves an understanding of all of the
factors that influence corporate behavior and how these can be used to achieve regulatory
goals.121 As evidence of this, they point to alternative regulatory techniques already in
use such as incentives and awards, accreditation systems, market-based initiatives and
compensation schemes, disclosure obligations and other privately or publicly sponsored
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initiatives.122 As a result of these developments, commentators argue that the crucial
question today is not “whether CSR should be voluntary or mandatory, but, in light of a
particular problem, what is the best response?”123
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CHAPTER 3 CSR IN THE CANADIAN CONTEXT
This Chapter turns away from the on-going academic debate canvassed in Chapter
2 to argue that CSR has largely won the battle of ideas in Canada. The purpose is to set
the stage for the remainder of this thesis by arguing that, the lack of a universally
accepted theoretical model for CSR notwithstanding, practical examples of CSR can now
be observed in this country. More specifically, the second part of this Chapter argues that
the emergence of CSR principles can be observed in the regulation and market practices
of the Canadian financial services industry and several developments in this area are
discussed.

3.1 Social Context in Canada
There can be little doubt that the concept of CSR has gained wide acceptance in
practice in Canada. For example, the Canadian Government confirms the relevance of
CSR on instrumentalist grounds as follows:
“Industry Canada promotes CSR principles and practices to Canadian
businesses because it makes companies more innovative, productive, and
competitive. CSR helps make Canadian business more competitive by
supporting operational efficiency gains; improved risk management;
favourable relations with the investment community and improved access
to capital; enhanced employee relations; stronger relationships with
communities and an enhanced licence to operate; and improved reputation
and branding.”124
Similarly, Canada’s department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
confirms the ethical obligations on Canadian companies operating abroad as follows:
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“Canada is a strong supporter of CSR. The Government of Canada expects
and encourages all Canadian companies working internationally to respect
all applicable laws and international standards, to operate transparently
and in consultation with host governments and local communities, and to
conduct their activities in a socially and environmentally responsible
manner. We work with the Canadian business community, civil society
groups, foreign governments and communities, as well as other
stakeholders to foster and promote CSR.”125
Janda et al note that CSR principles may also be underpinned by private law in
Canada as they inform standards of care in civil liability and to the extent that they are
incorporated into the contractual commitments of companies.126 Moreover, they point out
in this context that the common law and courts are now emerging as important parts of
CSR as companies that cause negative social and environmental impacts may be liable
under tort law.127 More broadly, other Canadian writers in this area claim that CSR has
largely “won the battle of ideas” in that, practically speaking, few corporations today
would argue publicly against the need for CSR efforts.128
It is interesting to note, however, that commentators have identified different
social and political contexts for CSR in Canada than might exist elsewhere. In the U.S.,
for example, commentators point out that the notion of CSR gained popular awareness in
the 1960s and 1970s with the emerging civil rights movements.129 They argue that
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increasing awareness of social issues was combined with a belief that corporations should
also be asked to make their own contributions to society.130 In the context of voluntary
CSR initiatives for example, it is understood that voluntary corporate codes of conduct
“first emerged in the United States in the 1970s in response to bad publicity caused by
U.S. companies engaging in bribery when operating abroad, but later came to include
industry wide codes of conduct covering environmental practices and labor standards as
well.”131
In the U.K., commentators note that the trend away from command and control
type regulation began in the 1970s with the introduction of economic liberalism and
adherence to the idea that small government would drive economic success.132 Under this
view, they point out that there was a belief that unnecessary government intervention in
the markets had damaged productivity and competitiveness and it followed that any
regulation in this area should be minimal. In this context, they argue that CSR emerged at
least in part as a way for U.K. companies to regulate themselves using voluntary
initiatives.133
In Canada, Foster and Meinhard have identified that CSR emerged somewhat
later in the 1980s, and largely as an ideological response to Canada’s own shifting
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political philosophies.134 They note that during the 1980s and 1990s, Canada was
evolving into a neo-conservative philosophy of statehood and that this, coupled with
forces of globalization, accelerated a “shift in priorities from domestic welfare
considerations to global economic strategies.”135 They argue that, in response to this shift
in political philosophy, there was a corresponding (and newly expressed) concern that “in
addition to government support of universal social programs, corporations should act as
responsible social citizens …”136
Interestingly, this shift in ideology occurred at around the same time as significant
increases in CSR activity were observed in Canada in the 1990s through the turn of the
millennium.137 On this point, Keith notes, for example, that CSR reporting rates for
companies listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange rose from 35 percent in 2001 to 60
percent in 2003 and then to 80 percent by 2007.138 Further, Keith argues that growing
public concern over the role of corporations during this period led to the establishment of
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the Canadian Democracy and Corporate Accountability Commission to promote national
CSR.139
However, despite these early developments and wins for CSR, it is important to
point out that the business case for CSR has not been fully established in Canada. On the
issue of the relationship between CSR and financial performance, for example, Foster and
Meinhard reviewed a number of early Canadian studies in this area which showed that
the relationship between firm social performance and financial performance produced
inconclusive results.140 They also reviewed more recent research during the 1990s that
produced similarly conflicting results: some studies found evidence of a positive
relationship while others found that no connection exists.141
In their own study, though, Foster and Meinhard considered the relationship
between public relations prominence of CSR activities and financial performance of
Ontario-based companies. They found that companies that gave more prominence to CSR
activities on their website and in their annual reports were also more likely to have high
scores on corporate citizenship, which included financial performance in their study.142
They noted that this result was consistent with some elements of the previous research
that showed a positive relationship between social disclosure and financial performance,
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implying that a “virtuous circle” may exist in Canada with CSR as both a predictor and a
consequence of financial performance.143

(a) Bill C-300
A notable step forward for CSR in the Canadian legal context occurred in 2009
with the introduction of a private member’s bill by John McKay, then a Liberal M.P.
from Scarborough East: the Corporate Accountability of Mining, Oil and Gas
Corporations in Developing Countries Act144(Bill C-300). Bill C-300 was intended to
promote social and environmental awareness relating to extractive companies who were
receiving Canadian government support to operate in developing countries.145 Despite its
eventual defeat, Keith argues that Bill C-300 remains an important development in the
Canadian CSR movement because it raised awareness in these areas and ultimately led to
the development of certain CSR initiatives by the Conservative government of Stephen
Harper.146 As most notable amongst these developments, Keith points to the recent
activity and work by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in
defining and implementing CSR.147
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More specifically, Seck points out that Bill C-300 was significant because it
would have given the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade the power to
develop corporate accountability standards and a complaint reporting process for the
Canadian extractive industry.148 Further, Seck describes that Bill C-300 contemplated that
the corporate accountability standards were in turn expected to incorporate, among
others, the social and environmental standards of the IFC. This is significant according to
Seck in that it was consistent with other initiatives indicating that the IFC’s standards
were to be used as a reference point for Canadian mining companies.149 A more
controversial issue, however, was whether Bill C-300, by adopting the IFC’s standards,
would also have imposed international human rights standards on Canadian
companies.150
Ultimately, Seck points out that Bill C-300 received significant support with some
commentators arguing on instrumentalist grounds that that it would give Canadian
companies in this area a competitive advantage over others by providing a forum to
address complaints and by requiring companies to respect human rights, thus reducing
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the chance of operations being disrupted by local communities experiencing unrest.”151
Despite this support, however, many critics contended that Bill C-300 was flawed from
the outset from a policy perspective, arguing that the penalties contemplated were not in
line with procedural processes, and that Canadian mining companies could be unfairly
targeted by a complaints process that could easily be abused by competitors.152 As a
result, Bill C-300, having been attacked by its critics and having received little political
support, was narrowly defeated by the Conservatives and died in the House of Commons
on October 27, 2010.153

3.2 CSR in Canadian Financial Services
This Section argues that CSR can now be situated in the context of the Canadian
financial services sector. Much of this analysis is based on the work of Benjamin
Richardson, a Canadian legal scholar in this area, who confirms that the “potential of
private financial organizations to be a force for environmentally and socially sound
development is no longer regarded as quackery, but as a serious issue gaining some
policy-makers’ attention.”154 Interestingly, the developments in this area can also be used
on analogous grounds to situate the social contract approach to CSR in the Canadian
financial sector.155 In the context of banking specifically, for example, Nicholls points out
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that, as Canadian financial institutions continue to grow in size and power, consideration
is being given to market conduct regulation to prevent unfair business practices and to
“community reinvestment” or “public utility” regulatory approaches.156 Nicholls points
out that this is evidence of the public’s perception that banks are generally not subject to
effective market discipline and need to be more closely regulated.157
Moreover, from a social concern perspective, Canadian courts have also already
recognized that banks are the focal point of the commercial operations of our society as
reported decisions acknowledge that banks generally enjoy good profit margins and
operate in a regulated environment where there are relatively few eligible participants. In
return for these privileges, these decisions have held that it may be fair to impose
additional social duties on banks; for example, to take certain steps to protect consumers
and the public from fraud and other illegal activities in the banking system.158 In addition,
Canadian banks with equity of more than one billion dollars are required, under section
459.3 of the Bank Act, to “. . . annually publish a statement describing the contribution of
the bank and its prescribed affiliates to the Canadian economy and society.”159 As such,
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most large Canadian banks build on the contents of this annual public accountability
requirement to create an annual CSR report that they publish on their websites.160
As a starting point, however, it is important to point out that the traditional (and
more natural) focus of financial regulation and oversight in Canada is typically on
prudential standards: solvency and liquidity requirements and avoiding risks to banks and
the broader economy.161 The primary regulatory goals in this area are to protect
depositors’ and investors’ funds and to avoid broader systemic risks that arise from the
linkages that necessarily exist among financial institutions so that no solvency situation
arises that could put the entire system at risk.162
Richardson notes that environmental and social issues traditionally did not fit into
this framework as those who traded in money were often seen as irrelevant to CSR and
the “province of social responsibility was not normally associated with banks, pension
funds, or other financiers.”163 As a result, Richardson argues there remained an
“enormous abyss” between financial regulation and CSR in Canada as there was virtually
no reference to CSR considerations in domestic financial laws.164 Rather, Richardson
argues with specific reference to environmental regulation, that Canadian government
strategy has been to treat these areas of policy as distinct, to be regulated separately:
160
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“[e]nvironmental regulation in Canada, as in most other nations, hardly
addresses the financial services sector—the banks and investors that
finance development. To most environmental lawyers, this might seem a
strange comment, as the province of environmental law is not normally
associated with banks, pension funds, or other financiers. If anything,
those who trade in money are seen as rather environmentally innocuous or
irrelevant, away from the main action, … . Although Canada has made
great strides in improving its environmental laws since the 1970s, this lack
of interaction between environmental and financial policy is arguably
Canadian environmental law’s greatest handicap.”165
There is, however, evidence that things are beginning to change. Richardson
points out that the trend is shifting as scholars and some policy makers are increasingly
recognizing the importance of the financial sector to CSR: based on their “ability to
provide financial leverage, financial organizations are in effect “gate keepers” to the
economy … principally because they have amassed vast empires of financial assets.”166
Richardson therefore argues that the biggest CSR impact of private financial institutions
is not their own social or ecological footprints, but, rather, their “strategic role in
allocating capital to other businesses.”167 Further, Richardson argues that this area is
growing in importance to the study of CSR as the “institutionalization” of financial
markets has put financial assets in Canada “increasingly into the control of banks,
pension funds, and other financial institutions, rather than into the hands of individual
retail investors.”168
In addition to these developments, it is also well established that secondary
reasons for government regulation of financial services in Canada may include more
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socially orientated goals: “consumer protection” and “minimizing fraud through money
laundering and terrorism.”169 Ogilvie argues, for example, that the financial system
requires honesty and trust to operate smoothly so regulation is needed to keep fraud and
consumer exploitation to a minimum.170 Interestingly, a similar justification is used by
OSFI, traditionally viewed as prudential regulator only, for its intervention into Canada’s
anti-money laundering and terrorist financing regime.171
Beyond this, CSR scholars have also identified the increasing importance that
social and environmental pressures have on marketing financial products and services.
For example, Richardson notes that greater awareness in this area has led to a
proliferation of social and environmental financial products, including “green mortgages,
ethical mutual funds and pollution damage liability insurance.”172 There is also evidence
of an emerging niche for ethical financing in Canada’s financial markets: Richardson
cites a national survey conducted in 2002 by the Social Investment Organization which
identified assets of environmentally and socially responsible investments as of June 2002
at CDN $ 51.4 billion.173 In addition, Richardson argues that there are some features of
financial products and institutions themselves that should support a commitment to
sustainable and long-term goals. For example, he argues that “because of their extended
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product liabilities, life insurance companies and pension funds should be biased toward
longer-term sustainable investments.”174
Finally, as discussed in the remainder of this thesis, Richardson points out that
banks should have an interest in the long-term viability of a borrower’s business in the
context of ensuring loan repayment, which can often be contracted over lengthy
periods.175 Similarly, Janda et al argue that social and environmental performance could
become important factors to consider in the loan underwriting process for banks.176 On
this point, Weber recently studied the efforts of several Canadian banks to integrate
environmental risks into their corporate loan requirements and found that they were “best
in class” in conducting environmental due diligence when compared to their global
peers.177 Along these lines, the instant thesis tests whether the EPs are also a good
example of this development as they are intended to provide a credit risk management
framework for managing environmental and social risks in project finance transactions.178
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3.3 Conclusion
This Chapter argues that the emergence of CSR can be observed in Canada and,
more specifically, the Canadian financial services industry. In particular, scholars have
identified that, with the growing economic importance and influence of financial
institutions, we should expect to see growing demands that these organizations act more
responsibly. However, expectations in this area should be tempered by the reality that
CSR remains in a state of flux and has yet to gain universal acceptance in this industry
sector. In Canada, in particular, significant work remains to be done to advance CSR
related theory in financial services. Moreover, additional work will be needed in this
context to establish the business case for CSR and, in particular, the long-term benefits
that it may offer for firms in the financial sector.
Using this background, the remainder of this thesis tests whether the practical
emergence of CSR can be observed in the context of the decision by Canadian banks to
adopt and adhere to the EPs. Ultimately, this case study will show that it is not clear
whether these developments demonstrate a clear commitment by banks to CSR, or
whether they are just reflections of prudent self-interested lending practices. Ultimately,
the business case for CSR suggests that it is likely to be some combination of the two.
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CHAPTER 4 – INTRODUCTION TO THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES
4.1 Introduction
This Chapter provides an overview of the EPs. As noted in the introduction to this
thesis, major global banks, together with the IFC and the World Bank Group developed
the EPs on June 4, 2003, to “provide a credit risk management framework for
determining, assessing and managing environmental and social risk in international
project finance transactions.”179 The EPs are based on the IFC’s social and environmental
policy framework, including the Environmental and Social Safeguard Policies, Pollution
Prevention and Abatement Guidelines.180 These IFC policies have evolved into what are
currently known and referred to in this thesis as the “IFC’s Performance Standards.” In
order to reflect developments in the IFC’s Performance Standards, the EPs requirements
were revised and updated on July 6, 2006 and became the EP II.
At the time of writing, the EPs are undergoing another strategic review process to
reflect recent updates to the IFC’s Performance Standards.181 The EPs Association
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released a draft of the revised and updated EPs (now referred to as EP III) for comment
and the formal Consultation and Public Comment period for the EP III closed on October
12, 2012.182 The EPs Association launched the EP III effective as of June 4, 2013, but
the effective date is subject to a transition period that will allow member banks to
continue using the current version of the EP II until December 31, 2013.183 As such, this
thesis focuses on EP II (referred to in this thesis as the EPs) and a brief overview of the
EPs is provided in this Chapter, along with a description of the requirements they
currently prescribe for member banks generally.184 The concluding Chapter of this thesis
provides a discussion of the EP III update process in order to support further study in this
area as the updated principles are implemented in the second half of 2013 and into
2014.185
As discussed below, the EPs represent a series of guidelines on the management
of social and environmental risks that banks voluntarily commit to follow in their project
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financing activities.186 As a result, this Chapter proceeds on the basis that the EPs provide
a real-world arena in which to study CSR in its broader forms: the idea adopted earlier in
this thesis that “a corporation must act in a responsible manner with regard to the
environment, community and broader society in which it operates.”187 The last Section of
this Chapter addresses some of the interesting international events that occurred on the
international project financing stage that led up to the development of the EPs.

4.2 Overview of the EPs
The EPs can be understood from a corporate governance perspective as an
example of industry self-regulation at the global level.188 As a voluntary code of conduct,
the principles apply only when a bank chooses to sign on to them and agrees to follow
certain requirements with respect to its project financing activities.189 Specifically,
member banks commit under the EPs that they will not provide loans to projects where
total capital costs will exceed U.S. $ 10 million and where the borrower will not or
cannot comply with the bank’s own social and environmental policies.190
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Under Principle 1, each adopting bank is required to undertake a characterization
exercise in respect of new projects being considered for financing:
Category A represents projects with potentially significant adverse social
or environmental impacts that are diverse, irreversible or unprecedented;
Category B represents projects with potentially limited adverse social or
environmental impacts that are few in number, generally site-specific,
largely reversible and readily addressed through mitigation measures; and
Category C represents projects with minimal or no social or environmental
impacts.191

Under Principle 2, for Category A and B projects, each bank commits to satisfy
itself that the key environmental and social issues identified during the categorization
process are properly addressed in a social and environmental assessment (Assessment)
that must be provided by the project’s sponsor or borrower.192 In addition, under
Principles 4 and 5, a project’s sponsor will be required to prepare and implement an
Action Plan (AP), establish a social and environmental management system, consult with
various stakeholders, and report on the implementation of the AP.193
Under Principle 6, the borrower is required to establish a grievance mechanism as
part of the management system in order to ensure that consultation, disclosure and
community engagement continues throughout construction and operation of the
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project.194 Under Principle 8, the EPs’ requirements must also be inserted into loan
covenants in the financing documents compelling the borrower to comply with the AP
during construction and operation of the project, and to provide regular reports on
compliance with the AP.195
Finally, Principle 10 requires banks to satisfy ongoing reporting requirements.196
Generally, the EPs Association states that this reporting should at a minimum include the
number of transactions screened by the member bank, including the categorization
accorded to transactions (and may include a breakdown by sector or region), and
information regarding implementation.197

4.3 Development of the EPs
The trends leading up to the development and adoption of the EPs in 2003 are
covered extensively in the literature. Writers in this area have identified that the
principles arose in the context of pressure from institutional investors and NGOs as
private banks began to do more project financing after the withdrawal of the World Bank
Group and other multilateral development banks (MDBs) from the market in the
1990s.198 They point out that, as private banks began to do more financing in emerging
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economies to fill the void left by the MDBs, many of them inevitably became embroiled
in their own projects with negative social and environmental impacts.199 As a result,
commentators argue the EPs emerged in the aftermath of these developments as a way for
banks to control and mitigate the negative impacts of the projects they were financing.200
The narrative in this area generally begins with a description of the withdrawal of
MDBs from international project financing in the 1990s over social and environmental
concerns.201 Commentators point out that project financing typically occurs in industries
with increased risk of negative social and environmental impacts: extractive industries,
and energy and transportation infrastructure.202 Moreover, they note that infrastructure
projects are often very large and can have substantial social and ecological footprints in
sensitive areas.203 Based on these observations, commentators argue that the withdrawal
of MDBs from project finance was precipitated by the fact that they were being
increasingly targeted by negative publicity and pressure over their involvement in these
types of projects.204
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This withdrawal of MDBs from international project financing occurred in the
face of increasing demand for financing for new and developing infrastructure projects.
This was particularly true, according to Wright, in developing countries where the
financing demands for such projects often far exceeded the resources available locally.205
On this point, the International Project Finance Association notes, for example, that
“[i]n the face of an ever increasing world population, greater expectations,
demands from society and budgetary constraints, governments are facing
an increasing amount of pressure to deliver new and improved
infrastructure projects in transport (roads, railways, bridges); education
(schools and universities); healthcare (hospitals, clinics and treatment
centers); waste management (collection, disposal, waste to energy plants);
water (collection, treatment, distribution), government accommodation
and defense.”206
In short, the money for these projects had to come from somewhere, and the stage
was set for private banks to enter the international project financing market.207 However,
commentators point out that, unlike the World Bank Group and MDBs, the mission of
private banks is not typically focused on social and sustainability issues.208 Hardenbrook
in particular identifies this fact, along with the lack of significant regulation and
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enforcement in developing nations, as contributing to a scenario in which project
sponsors and their banks were in many cases free to set their own standards for
development projects.209 Moreover, since establishing and enforcing social and
environmental standards increases the costs of a project, little incentive existed to impose
strict standards in this area. The result of this combination, according to Hardenbrook,
was that privately financed projects often resulted in significant negative social and
environmental impacts.210 Similarly, Lawrence and Thomas argue on this point that,
absent the involvement of an MDB, it was highly unlikely that private social and
environmental standards would be imposed on any given project.211 Given this
background, it is not surprising that, as they began to do more financing in emerging
economies to the fill the void left by the MDBs, many private banks became embroiled in
their own projects with negative publicity over significant social and environmental
impacts.212
In fact, although no one incident or project is said to have triggered the
development and adoption of the EPs, the literature identifies the public backlash from
the private sector financing of the highly controversial Three Gorges Dam Project
(TGDP) in the Peoples Republic of China as having played a significant role.213 The
China Three Gorges Corporation (CTGPC) identifies December 14, 1994, as the official
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kick off date for TGDP on the Yangtze River. It now claims to be one of the largest
hydropower-complex projects in the world with twenty-six turbine-generator units, each
with installed capacity of 700MW, sending electricity to Central China, East China,
Guangdong, and Chongqing, with a maximum transmission range of over 1000
kilometers.214
Aside from being one of the largest hydro-electric installations in the world,
TGDP was by all accounts also an incredibly expensive undertaking. Although there are
no universally accepted publicly available figures, original estimates put the cost of the
project at U.S. $ 9 billion and this estimate more than doubled by 2000, and is expected
to have been close to U.S. $ 57 billion by completion.215 Cook notes that, with the
withdrawal of World Bank Group over social and environmental concerns, the Chinese
government looked to external funding from large international private banks.216 As a
result, Cook describes a financing structure in which bonds were issued for the State
Development Bank of China, which in turn loaned money to TGDP, and several major
private banks acted as the arrangers on the initial Chinese bond offerings.217
Almost from the outset of TGDP, commentators predicted social and ecological
catastrophe for the surrounding areas and the project and its financiers received
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significant (and well documented) negative attention from NGOs.218 As a result, some
commentators now look back to TGDP as representing a “watershed moment” in the
international NGO movement as pressure began to be directed primarily at private
banks.219 They note that, until the time of TGDP, NGOs were focused on public
development finance and, in particular, lending from the World Bank Group and other
MDBs.220 However, after TGDP, environmentalists and NGOs began to adopt their
approach to advocacy by attacking private project financiers directly.221 Wright refers to
this phenomenon as the “boomerang effect:” NGOs effectively drew on their existing
advocacy networks previously used to launch successful campaigns against the World
Bank Group and other MDBs.222 Wright argues that “[a]pplying this strategy to the world
of private finance, local community groups and international NGOs sought to halt
projects by confronting commercial banks at the project level in countries hosting their
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investments and at the corporate headquarters and consumer bank branches in their home
countries.”223

4.4 Conclusion
The scholarship in this area confirms that the EPs emerged in the aftermath of
negative publicity campaigns against private banks brought about by their financing of
large international projects like TGDP.224 In the context of these developments,
commentators argue that, even in cases where the project sponsor or direct borrower is a
profitable company, private banks may still face increased risks from associated negative
social and environmental impacts that might slow down or shut down a project.225 As a
result, it is now understood that“[i]n these cases, financial institutions are forced to
consider whether the environmental and social risks of the project, including potential
damages to their corporate reputation, will outweigh any short and long-term financial
benefits that the project may generate.”226 As discussed in Chapter 5, it is in this context
that the EPs emerged at least in part as a logical and business orientated response to these
concerns: a way for private banks to control the negative social and environmental
outcomes of the projects they are associated with.
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CHAPTER 5 – THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE EPS
This Chapter provides a review of the EPs related scholarship that has emerged
since the principles were launched in 2003. Section 5.1 considers a fundamental question
posed by scholars: why would banks and other profit maximizing financial institutions
voluntarily develop and adopt a code like the EPs? A review of several papers that
address this apparent contradiction is provided to show that pragmatic business
motivations are behind EPs adoption: it is generally accepted in this scholarship that
banks look to the principles to reduce certain credit and reputational risks. As a result,
Section 5.1 concludes that the EPs represent an example of the business case for CSR.227
Turning away from the issue of why banks adopt the EPs, Section 5.2 provides a
review of the theoretical CSR framework for the EPs developed in the literature. It is
generally well accepted in this scholarship that the principles amount to a voluntary code,
thereby evidencing an example of the new form of regulation known as “soft law.”228
Finally, Section 5.3 canvasses some of the concerns that have emerged regarding
EPs’ compliance and the so-called “free-rider” problem. As noted, one of the main
drawbacks of voluntary CSR initiatives like the EPs remains that they often lack the
necessary procedural and enforcement measures to implement compliance and effectively
promote CSR values. As a result, in the case of the EPs specifically, critics now argue
that banks may get the reputational benefit of EPs adoption irrespective of their
implementation and compliance practices.
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5.1 EPs Adoption
The scholarship in this area confirms that the EPs have gained wide acceptance in
the global banking community. Macve and Chen cite to an EPs press release that states
that 71 percent of total project finance debts in emerging market economies were
subjected to EPs in 2007 (U.S. $ 52.9 billion out of a total of U.S. $ 74.6 billion).229
Similarly, Conley and Williams note that an estimated 85 percent of international project
financing in emerging markets was expected to be subject to the EPs as of 2011.230 More
generally, other commentators argue that the EPs’ impact on the financial sector has been
far greater than predicted.231 Wright and Rwabizambuga describe the EPs’ effective
market penetration among the world’s largest project finance providers, noting that all
but three of the top ten global arrangers of project finance loans have signed on to the
EPs.232 Similarly, Amalric notes that the EPs have become one of the more visible and
concrete global initiatives promoting social concerns and sustainable development.233
Given this wide-spread adoption rate, a significant body of legal, economic and
business literature has emerged to consider banks’ motivations for joining the EPs. The
dominant theme in this scholarship is that adopters of the EPs see the principles as good
for business, even if, for any one bank, they increase short-term costs and limit growth
opportunities:
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“[i]n one way or another, the creators of the EPs see them as good for
business, even if, for any one bank in the near term, they increase the costs
of evaluating potential loans and monitoring on-going compliance, and
may even limit opportunities. That banks articulate instrumental motives
should not surprise us, since we (and the law) expect business managers to
make decisions that they perceive to be in the interests of their firm and its
shareholders.”234
On this point, Amalric argues that, as with other instances of industry selfregulation, the EPs raise crucial questions about motivation: “[i]f the banks’ overarching
aim is to maximize firm value, what is their interest in participating in a self-regulatory
initiative?”235 Several papers have considered this question. In his own research, Amalric
notes that the costs of EPs adoption to member banks are easily identified: (i) the costs of
identifying the potential social and environmental risks of a project in order to categorize
it according to the EPs’ requirements; (ii) the costs of checking the adequacy of the
reports and information provided by borrowers; (iii) the costs of monitoring compliance;
(iv) the costs of enforcing compliance; and (v) the overall opportunity cost of turning
down project deals that do not comply with EPs’ requirements.236
As a result, Amalric notes that banks engage in a cost-benefit analysis: the
expected benefits in adopting the EPs should outweigh the expected costs of
compliance.237 Similarly, Scholtens and Dam considered incentives for EPs adoption
using microeconomic analysis and concluded that individual banks are likely to engage in
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the EPs only if the perceived benefits exceed the associated costs.238 Hardenbrook
concludes on this point in more general terms that:
“[b]y incorporating environmental provisions in loan agreements, the
EPFIs increase a project’s transaction cost. This increase directly impacts
the profits of the company constructing the project and thereby affects its
ability to repay the loan. At first blush, it appears that adopting the
Equator Principles would be detrimental to a private institution’s goal of
increasing shareholder profit. Since the Equator Principles appear to be
detrimental to a bank’s interest, it is important to identify the incentives
that encourage banks to adopt the Equator Principles.”239
(a) Incentives for EPs Adoption
As will be discussed in further detail below, the literature identifies two principal
benefits for banks associated with EPs adoption. Both of these are held to be instrumental
motivations, in that they allow EPs member banks to advance their own interests:240
(i)

the management of the credit risk inherent in global project financing; and

(ii)

the mitigation of the reputational risk of being associated with projects
that result in negative social and environmental impacts.

(i) Managing risks in project finance
Several authors have looked at the emergence of the EPs as a way for adopting
banks to reduce their exposure to lending or credit risks inherent in project financing.241
In this regard, the EPs Association itself confirms that for “a number of years, banks
working in the Project Finance sector had been seeking ways to assess and manage the
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environmental and social risks associated with such investment activities.”242 The
inherent lending risks are easily identified within the technical definition of project
financing adopted by the EPs:
“Project finance (PF) is a method of funding in which the lender looks
primarily to the revenues generated by a single project, both as the source
of repayment and as security for the exposure. This type of financing is
usually for large, complex and expensive installations that might include,
for example, power plants, chemical processing plants, mines,
transportation infrastructure, environment, and telecommunications
infrastructure. Project finance may take the form of financing of the
construction of a new capital installation, or refinancing of an existing
installation, with or without improvements.
In such transactions, the lender is usually paid solely or almost exclusively
out of the money generated by the contracts for the facility’s output, such
as the electricity sold by a power plant. The borrower is usually an SPE
that is not permitted to perform any function other than developing,
owning, and operating the installation. The consequence is that repayment
depends primarily on the project’s cash flow and on the collateral value of
the project’s assets. In contrast, if repayment of the exposure depends
primarily on a well-established, diversified, credit-worthy, contractually
obligated end user for repayment, it is considered a secured exposure to
that end-user.” 243
There is no question that this form of financing is inherently risky to lenders,
especially when compared to more conventional forms of collateralized lending. This is
because, in project finance, the “lender looks primarily to the revenues generated by a
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single project, both as the source of repayment and as security for the exposure.”244 The
project essentially “stands alone as a credit matter,” meaning that, if the project fails, the
lender will have little or no recourse against the borrower’s assets for repayment of the
loan: the lender will only be able to realize on the value of the project, including the
project’s assets and revenue stream.245 As a result, with the “collateral in these
arrangements being lower than in normal credit transactions, credit risks are
automatically higher, and there is a direct link between the social and environmental risks
of the project and the credit risks borne by the lenders.”246
Based on this legal structure, Conley and Williams argue that many types of
social and environmental risks that are considered externalities in conventional lending
(e.g., a human rights issues, displacement of local population or an environmental
disaster) may become directly significant to project finance transactions because they
could put a lender at risk if they cause a project to be delayed or shut down.247 Indirect
risks may also be present here because, as Scholtens points out, in a case where a bank is
forced to realize on a project’s assets, there is the risk that the bank could become liable
for contamination or threats to the surrounding population.248 Further, as noted below in
Section 5.1(a)(ii) of this thesis, these issues may become especially relevant in the
context of reputational concerns as major international projects typically attract
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significant attention from NGOs when they are expected to result in negative social and
environmental outcomes.
Based on these considerations, commentators argue that a bank’s return on
investment for any given project may in fact depend on the proper management of the
specific social and environmental issues that are inserted into the project’s risk profile.249
As a result, it is now well accepted in the scholarship that the initial EPs banks were
looking for ways to “level the playing field” by establishing a minimum standard to
which all major global project financing lenders would adhere. 250 Hardenbrook argues,
for example, that
“[b]anks have a large incentive to manage the risks of their investments
carefully to ensure repayment of the loan. A project that creates
environmental degradation exposes the borrower to liability. Depending
on the country, the borrower could incur substantial fines for violating
local environmental laws and court fees for defending against these
lawsuits.”251

(ii) Reputation risk management
Scholars have also considered the emergence of the EPs as a tool used by banks to
“level the playing field” among different banks facing different reputation risks in the
project financing industry.252 In this regard, although the EPs are theoretically a voluntary
code, it should be pointed out that the decision to develop and adopt the principles was
likely forced at least in part by increased reputational risks in changing market conditions
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(see the discussion of TGDP in Section 4.3 of this thesis).253 Amalric defines a bank’s
reputation risk in this context as:
“the probability of being a target of a public campaign multiplied by the
cost for the bank of such a campaign … Banks with a well established
brand name and located in countries with strong non-governmental
organizations, are by and large more likely to be the target of public
campaigns than small specialized banks located in countries with weak
NGOs; and banks involved in commercial retail banking and thus
vulnerable to consumer boycotts will likely incur higher losses than
specialized boutiques from NGO-led public campaigns. Hence we can
reasonably assume that banks differ in terms of reputation risk.”254
Richardson notes on this point that voluntary codes like the EPs often can only be
considered “voluntary” to the extent that their adoption is not formally obliged by
authorities: they are “seldom if ever “voluntary” initiatives in the sense that they are
“made autonomously and freely,” and most are “adopted because the relevant actors have
been pressured to act.”255 Richardson notes that pressure in this area can come from any
number of sources: threat of mandatory regulation, negative publicity, competitive
pressures, demands from the local community and corporate stakeholders, and industry
associations and organizations.256
As support for this position in the context of the EPs, O’Sullivan and O’Dwyer
argue that the initial banks were likely pursuing an “appeasement strategy:” the
development of the EPs to mitigate the reputational risk caused by NGO campaigns and
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to gain legitimacy for their financing activities.257 Similarly, Conley and Williams point
out that the EPs likely represented a way to increase the adopting banks’ legitimacy in the
context of large-scale infrastructure financing and permitted them to “counter critics of
large development projects by asserting their ability to manage the risks created by those
projects and simultaneously to resist further strengthening of the standards or the
imposition of “hard law.””258 Conley and Williams also describe the EPs in this context
as a sort of “prisoner’s dilemma:”
“each bank faces reputational risk if it finances a project that leads to a
social or environmental disaster, and each would presumably be better off
avoiding such risk. But each bank also fears commercial disadvantage
from acting alone to limit its lending. An agreement to level the playing
field avoids this difficult choice by eliminating the commercial
disadvantage for any one bank.”259
Similarly, on this point, Amalric argues that the EPs amount to a “strategy
devised by high reputation risk banks to restore a level playing field with their less
exposed competitors. The purpose of the initiative is to impose the voluntary standards
developed by the more exposed banks on all members of the industry.”260
Commentators have also commented positively on the relationship between EPs
adoption and the significant reputational pressures faced by primarily retail banks. In
their study, Conley and Williams note that the importance of reputational risk is
evidenced by the fact that, of the banks that were most active in developing the EPs, most
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had large retail businesses making them more sensitive to their reputations.261 Similarly,
Scholtens and Dam demonstrate that CSR behavior is especially displayed by banks that
are in the “spotlight,” and that the CSR policies of EPs member banks are typically rated
higher than non-member banks.262 Importantly, however, they argue that this may not be
mere “window dressing” by banks because they observed no significant impact on the
adopters’ stock market value when they announced adoption (implying that adoption may
be for reasons other than immediate increase in firm value).263 Rather, Scholtens and
Dam suggest that “adoption is undertaken by banks that pay a lot of attention to CSR,”
and that adopting the EPs enables them to “signal this position to the public … and, as
such, positively impacts the risk profile of the adopter.”264
Wright and Rwabizambuga’s study of the proliferation of the EPs globally
provides additional insight in this area.265 The authors begin by arguing that the decision
to adopt a code of conduct that establishes a firm’s commitment to CSR is typically
embedded in the firm’s broader reputational risk management strategies.266 This is true
according to the authors in at least four ways: first, a firm’s overall reputation and brand
may benefit from the adoption of CSR; second, a firm may be able to differentiate itself
on this basis; third, a firm may view this as appropriate in the context of its overall risk
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management strategy;267 and fourth, a firm may view this as a way of reducing the risk of
being targeted by regulators and NGOs.268
Based on this, Wright and Rwabizambuga’s study considers the regional adoption
rates for the EPs among banks, and concludes that adoption rates vary significantly by
region, and are concentrated in Western Europe and North America.269 The authors point
to the strong regulatory and reputational pressures faced by Western European and North
American financial institutions as one possible explanation for this regional adoption
pattern. Moreover, they argue that the strong institutional environments in which western
banks operate along with significant reputational pressures may in fact compel them to
adopt voluntary codes like the EPs. As a result, Wright and Rwabizambuga’s study may
be used to identify the following key characteristics of EPs banks generally:270
(i)

they are based in countries in which the importance of environmental and
social issues is recognized (the authors note that this may explain the large
share of western banks among early EPs adopters);

(ii)

they tend to specialize in services and functions with the most visibility
(e.g., banks engaged in retail banking services);

(iii)

they are concentrated in institutional environments shaped by advocacy
campaigns and strong regulatory systems; and
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(iv)

they typically operate transnationally and are more likely to have high
profile roles in large international project finance deals, increasing the risk
to their corporate reputations.

(b) EPs and the Business Case for CSR
The incentives for EPs adoption discussed in Section 5.1(a) above are all held to
be instrumental in that they allow adopting banks to further their own interests. As a
result, scholars have also started to consider EPs adoption as an example of the business
case for CSR.271 Macve and Chen argue, for example, that the EPs may be used to
consider how banks are determining the scope of their CSR in the context of enlightened
shareholder theory, concluding that EPs adoption can add value to banks.272 They note
that the EPs are:
“[c]onsistent with the enlightened shareholder theory explanation of how
banks respond to CSR and sustainability concerns, … Not only has the
dominant political and business consensus maintained enlightened
shareholder theory as the legal basis in the UK of corporate objectives and
directors’ duties, it is consistent with the observed variety in level of take
up of EP in the different economic, social and political environments in
different countries.” 273
The authors test the business case or “value add” by considering the enhanced
mitigation of credit and reputational risks enjoyed by member banks. They conclude that
enlightened shareholder theory is “consistent with the observed variety in level of take up
of EP in the different economic, social and political environments” and that the EPs also
“assist banks in building a shared social construction, in responding to stakeholder
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pressures and concerns, of what are the current and likely future boundaries of
enlightened shareholder theory-driven performance.”274
Similarly, Wright and Rwabizambuga, argue that adopting a voluntary code like
the EPs can add value to a firm. They refer specifically to improved corporate reputation
and branding; increased competitiveness; increased access to capital markets and
financing; and decreased scrutiny in public consultation hearings and approval processes.
They argue that each of these factors can reduce a firm’s project cost and associated
expenses. More generally, they argue that a firm’s adoption of a voluntary code may also
allow it to more effectively respond to the variety of demands imposed on it by multiple
stakeholder groups.275

5.2 The CSR Context for the EPs
Beyond the pragmatic literature in respect of why banks have signed on to the
EPs, there is also an emerging body of social science literature addressing theoretical
questions about the EPs as they relate to voluntary codes of corporate conduct,
regulation, globalization and global governance.276 Commentators note generally that this
new context has given rise to various forms of “new governance” or “private
governance” theories that have emerged as models to govern corporate behavior.277 As
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noted in Chapter 2 of this thesis, traditional regulation seeks to control corporate conduct
through mandatory requirements backed up by enforcement mechanisms and penalties
for non-compliance. On the other hand, voluntary codes like the EPs may represent a
more “reflexive” approach to guiding corporate behavior – by engaging with businesses
to consider what form corporate behavior should take, by incentivizing businesses to act
in certain ways and by reinforcing the need for open and transparent disclosure of
corporate activities.278
In this context, the EPs have been used by a number of authors to examine the
development of voluntary codes. Macve and Chen argue, for example, that the EPs are an
example of “soft-law” because of the way in which they prescribe a certain framework of
requirements that applies only once a bank voluntarily agrees to sign on to the
principles.279 Similarly, Hardenbrook notes that traditionally, private entities like banks
were viewed as primarily reactionary to mandatory regulation, but that this “reactionary
stance is evolving, and private institutions are beginning to take an increasingly proactive
role by self-regulating.”280 Under this new conception, Hardenbrook argues the EPs
represent a “proactive stance in the area of environmental regulation and are a major
change in the private sector’s traditional role.”281 Ultimately, Hardenbrook concludes that
the EPs therefore fall into a category of reflexive legislation known as “private second-
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order regulatory agreements,” meaning that they are agreements between private parties,
rather than governmental organizations.282
In terms of the more specific taxonomy defined by corporate code of conduct
literature, Wright and Rwabizambuga argue that the EPs are both a “third-party” and
“commitment” code of conduct, in that they emerged with support from the World Bank
Group and IFC (as the third parties) and include requirements for adopters to follow (the
commitment).283 Similarly, on this point, Richardson notes that
“[c]odes of conduct, negotiated agreements, and unilateral declarations of
commitment are some of the various means by which the private sector
can take actions to support broader public policy goals on social and
environmental causes. … Third parties are actors at arm’s length from
both the individual businesses who implement the codes and from public
authorities. They may be environmental NGOs, industry associations,
international technical standardization bodies, or an intergovernmental
entity such as the International Finance Corporation in the case of the
Equator Principles.”284
Interestingly, Rupp and Williams have recently gone beyond this traditional
positioning in the CSR literature, using the EPs example to support their model of a
psychological approach to regulation: they argue that a model of soft law that focuses on
a broader range of motivations and moral reasoning might be more effective than current
approaches in this area that rely primarily on instrumental motivations.285 The authors
acknowledge the importance of self-interested reasons for firms to participate in soft law
initiatives and note that they “do not mean to suggest that self-interest is not a primary
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factor in many firm decisions.”286 They do, however, suggest that self-interest is not the
only factor and that a model that engages in a broader range of interests has the potential
to “more effectively encourage behaviors that optimize society’s regulatory goals than do
approaches that rely only on appeal to the instrumental considerations or self-interest of
the regulated entity.”287

5.3 EPs Compliance and the “Free-Rider” Problem
As discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, one of the main drawbacks of CSR and
voluntary initiatives like the EPs remains that they often lack the necessary compliance
and enforcement measures to effectively promote and implement CSR values. Moreover,
there is always the risk that corporations may pursue voluntary initiatives in the CSR area
for strategic reasons only.288 Interestingly, this issue has become particularly significant
in the context of the EPs as critics focus on the inherent non-binding nature of the
principles to argue that they may not be enough to achieve responsible corporate conduct
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in practice.289 Moreover, many member banks have been criticized for lacking
transparency and accountability in their compliance with the EPs. In fact, commentators
note that many of the same NGOs that initially supported the development of the EPs
have now turned into some of the member banks’ harshest critics.290
These concerns are covered extensively in the EPs related scholarship.
Richardson points out, for example, that skepticism continues to surround the EPs
because of the lack of transparency, disclosure and accountability in the way they are
adopted and implemented. More specifically, Richardson notes that the EPs do not
provide a forum for interested persons to assess EPs compliance by member banks.291
Along these lines, Hardenbrook points out that particularly problematic is the fact that the
EPs do not prescribe procedural requirements in this area.292 As a result of this, it can be
argued that the EPs provide no way for interested groups to challenge member banks’
decision making and disclosures, and that there is no mechanism to challenge a project
categorization that is deficient.293
As noted above, the EPs leave it to member banks to categorize new potential
projects as either Category A, B or C, depending on their expected negative social and
environmental impacts.294 However, on this point, Richardson states that, although
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environmental legislation would typically allow interested persons to review and
challenge this kind of “threshold decision,” the EPs provide no methodology for
certifying that a project meets the EPs’ criteria and there is no process in place to certify
compliance with the categorization process.295
An interrelated area of concern is the issue of enforceability. Each bank that
adopts the EPs voluntarily commits to developing internal policies and processes to
implement the EPs’ requirements. However, beyond this voluntary commitment, the
requirement for member banks to implement the EPs is not clear.296 Hardenbrook points
out that the EPs specifically disavow liability for member banks so it is up to each
member bank to perform its own due diligence on a project and enforce compliance with
the EPs where necessary.297 Hardenbrook notes that the result of this is that the EPs do
not provide for any recourse against a bank that adopts the EPs in name only and fails to
implement any of the requirements.298 Similarly, Lawrence and Thomas argue that
member banks have agreed to a set of principles that
“purport to guide their lending decisions, but those principles are only
guidelines for internal procedures that no outside person has a right to
enforce. Accordingly, signatories can legitimately argue, with respect to
any lending decision, that their internal policies and procedures do not
require them to comply with the Equator Principles, the PPAH, or the
safeguard policies in a particular case or under particular
circumstances.”299
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These issues have now given rise to the so-called “free-rider” problem.300 The
free-rider problem arises in the context of the EPs because, as discussed above, no formal
procedural or enforcement mechanisms exist to monitor the practices of individual
member banks. This means that all banks are likely to gain some reputational benefits by
adopting the EPs even if they do not implement all (or any) of the EPs’ requirements.301
The free-rider concept is not necessarily specific to the EPs as Amalric notes that a
“general problem of industry self-regulation is to ensure that all actors in the industry
abide by the voluntary regulation,” and this may be a relevant (although not exclusive)
problem to the case of the EPs because of the lack of any structure to oversee
implementation.302 However, it is also important to point out that other commentators
have expressed concern that the problem may be particularly pronounced in the case of
the EPs because some banks may adopt the principles precisely because of the free-rider
benefits without any intention of actually complying with principles.303
Finally, Conley and Williams argue that one of the most observable
manifestations of the free-rider problem arises because of the lack of established full
disclosure requirements: the EPs’ require only cumulative disclosure reports and nothing
about individual projects.304 As will be discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis in the context
of Canadian banks’ EPs disclosure practices, this makes it virtually impossible to
300
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determine if an individual bank is complying with the EPs’ standards on a project by
project basis. As a result, commentators argue that, without more information in this area,
it can be difficult to measure whether free-riding actually does occur for any given bank
or on any given project.305 Ultimately, as will be discussed later in Chapters 6 and 7 of
this thesis, this is also problematic in the context of trying to assess the overall
effectiveness of the EPs: it makes it virtually impossible to measure whether the
principles have achieved positive social and environmental outcomes in practice.306

5.4 Conclusion
As discussed above, this thesis proceeds on the basis that the EPs offer the chance
to study CSR and, more specifically, the business case for CSR, because of the way they
propose to merge CSR values with the business goals of member banks. It is well
established in the EPs scholarship that member banks see the principles as good for
business in that they serve to reduce certain credit and reputational risks inherent in
project financing. Some scholars go so far as to argue that further development of CSR
may in fact depend on these types of initiatives and, in the case of the banking sector
specifically, the willingness of banks to continue to adopt and adhere to the EPs.307
However, scholars in this area also point out that the value of the EPs as a
workable CSR model will depend on how they are implemented and that the quality of
implementation in turn depends on accountability, transparency and enforceability.308 In
305
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this regard, some commentators point to the problems discussed in Section 5.3 above to
argue that a specific standard of review should now be established to deter the free-rider
problem and to provide a way for determining whether a specific project has met the EPs’
requirements.309 Although mandatory requirements are unlikely in the short-term, it is
submitted here that something clearly needs to be done to address the concerns
surrounding EPs compliance and disclosure by member banks. Commentators in this area
have already acknowledged that free-riding could pose a substantial threat to the survival
of the EPs because it clearly weakens the legitimacy of the principles.310 They note that
this would be particularly true if the practice becomes a trend in the banking
community.311 Ultimately, as discussed in the following Chapters of this thesis, this result
could serve to provide NGOs with justification for their argument that EPs compliance
should be a legal requirement and that member banks should be subject to independent
monitoring and enforcement.312
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Chapter 6 - The Role of the EPs in Canadian Banking
This Chapter tests the relevance of the EPs in Canada by reviewing the EPs
related public disclosure of key Canadian banks. It considers the incentives for EPs
adoption in Canada and also considers whether Canadian banks are adequately reporting
their EPs compliance practices. The goal is to determine how far (if at all) the EPs have
become embedded in Canadian banking. As noted in the introduction to this thesis, at the
time of writing, seven major Canadian financial institutions have signed on to the EPs,
including Royal Bank of Canada (RBC); Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD); Bank of Nova
Scotia (BNS); Bank of Montreal (BMO); Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC);
Export Development Canada; and Manulife Financial.313 The primary focus of this study
is on the EPs disclosures of Canada’s five largest banks (referred to in this thesis as the
“Big-5” Canadian banks), RBC, TD, BMO, BNS and CIBC, during the period 2008 2012. The Big-5 Canadian banks are recognized as leaders among Canadian banks, so
although this study only looks in detail at them, the findings should be attributable to the
Canadian baking sector more generally.314
The methodology for this research was adopted from a similar study conducted by
Macve and Chen of EPs disclosures by Barclays and HSBC in the U.K.315 The authors
noted in their paper that the EPs provide an interesting institutional arena for analyzing
313
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how banks are implementing CSR but noted that there remains a need for further research
to investigate actual practice and how this varies over time.316 The instant research will
respond to this call for further study from the Canadian perspective by considering the
following questions:
1. What are the motivations for adopting and adhering to the EPs in Canada?
2. Are Canadian banks’ EPs disclosures adequate and credible?
3. How far have the EPs become embedded in Canadian banking?

6.1 EPs Disclosure by Canadian Banks
Under Principle 10 of the EPs, each member bank is required to report annually
about its EPs implementation processes and experience:
Principle 10: EPFI Reporting
Each EPFI adopting the Equator Principles commits to report publicly
at least annually about its Equator Principles implementation
processes and experience, taking into account appropriate
confidentiality considerations.317

The footnote to Principle 10 states that the reporting should include (as a
minimum) the number of transactions screened by each bank and the categorization
accorded to each transaction. It appears optional under Principle 10 for the banks to also
provide a breakdown by business sector or geographic region and other “information
regarding implementation.”318 A reporting best practices guide is available to banks, but
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it is not a required reporting frame-work and offers only guidance to assist banks in the
development of their own reporting methodologies.319
As noted in Chapter 3 of this thesis, Canadian banks with equity of more than one
billion Canadian dollars are required by section 459.3 of the Bank Act to “. . . annually
publish a statement describing the contribution of the bank and its prescribed affiliates to
the Canadian economy and society.”320 As such, large Canadian banks, each of the Big-5
Canadian banks included, typically build on the contents of this annual reporting
requirement to create their overall CSR reporting (for ease of reference, the reports in this
area are generally referred to below as the “CSR Reports” for each bank studied). Each
bank also sets out their EPs disclosure as required under Principle 10 within the
“environmental” or “responsible lending” sections of their CSR Reports or on other CSR
related sections of their websites.321
The results of the EPs reporting for each of RBC, TD, BMO, BNS and CIBC
during the period 2008 - 2012 are set out in the following Table 1:
Project type
Equator
Principles
Category A
Equator
Principles
Category B
Equator
Principles
Category C
Total Projects

2012
0

Royal Bank of Canada
2011
2010
0
1

2009
0

2008
0

9

13

4

5

3

1

2

2

1

2

10

15

7

6

5
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Source: RBC’s 2012, 2011 and 2008 CSR Reports, available online at:
http://www.rbc.com/community-sustainability/reporting-performance.html

Project type
Equator
Principles
Category A
Equator
Principles
Category B
Equator
Principles
Category C
Total Projects

2012
0

2011
0

0

0

12

8

Project type
Equator
Principles
Category A
Equator
Principles
Category B
Equator
Principles
Category C
Total Projects

2012
Not published

2011
0

Not published

2

Not published

0

Project type
Equator
Principles
Category A
Equator
Principles
Category B
Equator
Principles
Category C
Total Projects

2012
3

2011
0

7

4

5

10

TD Bank and Trust
2010
0

2009
0

2008
0

2

1

7

3

0

4

12
8
5
1
Source: TD’s 2012 and 2011 CSR Reports, available online at:
http://www.td.com/corporate-responsibility/report-centre/index.jsp.

Bank of Montreal
2010
0

11

2009
0

2008
0

5

0

1

0

1

1

N/a
2
5
1
2
Source: BMO Website – Responsible Lending Website, available online at:
http://www.bmo.com/home/about/banking/corporateresponsibility/customers/responsible-lending --

Bank of Nova Scotia
2010
1

2009
0

2008
1

7

1

6

8

3

3

15
14
16
4
Source: BNS’s 2008 – 2012 CSR Reports, available online at:
http://www.scotiabank.com/ca/en/0,,2590,00.html
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Project type
Equator
Principles
Category A
Equator
Principles
Category B
Equator
Principles
Category C
Total Projects

2012
0

Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
2011
2010
2009
0
1
0

2008
0

12

1

3

0

0

5

7

3

0

0

17
8
7
0
Source: CIBC’s 2008 – 2012 CSR Reports, available online at:
https://www.cibc.com/ca/cibc-and-you/public-account.html

0

6.2 Analysis
(a) What are the motivations for adopting the EPs in Canada?
As discussed in Section 5.1 of this thesis, the literature points to NGO pressure,
credit risk mitigation and reputational risk management as the leading factors in the
creation and adoption of the EPs.322 As might be expected, given that Canada is a western
country with relatively vibrant public policy and corporate regulatory systems, Wright
and Rwabizambuga’s analysis of global EPs adoption patterns matches up well in the
Canadian market: each of the Big-5 Canadian banks has formally adopted the EPs so it is
uncontroversial to say that the principles are now well accepted in Canadian banking.323
Interestingly, however, despite the wide-spread adoption of the EPs in Canada,
Canadian banks do not at present have extensive project financing activities that are
subject to the EPs’ requirements. The results of this study (contained in the tables above)
show that Canadian banks engaged in only a small number of project finance transactions
that were subject to the EPs during the period 2008 - 2012: RBC, TD, BMO, BNS and
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CIBC had on average only 36 EPs project finance deals per year between them during the
five year period studied. By way of comparison, Macve and Chen identified that Barclays
alone had 54 EPs project finance deals in 2007.324 This result suggests that Canadian
banks are primarily interested in the reputational benefits of EPs adoption, since the
incentive to manage credit risk in project financing is not, practically speaking, present.
As noted above, a bank can adopt the EPs by simply issuing a press release stating its
intention to follow the rules and there is no official organizational body that certifies or
monitors EPs adoption or implementation – meaning that any bank can choose to adopt
the EPs and benefit from the associated reputational benefits.325
TD provides an example of this issue. In terms of TD’s motivations for adopting
the EPs, the Bank states in its 2011 CSR Report that it adopted the EPs in 2007 as part of
its “wider credit risk management process.”326 Taken on its face, this statement indicates
that TD was motivated primarily by the credit risk management advantages offered by
the principles. However, upon further review, it is more likely that TD uses the EPs for
their reputational benefits in these areas: TD is primarily a retail bank, with 80% of its
total financing based on personal and residential lending in North America.327 Moreover,
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TD itself confirms that only 5 percent of the bank’s total financing activities involve
clients operating in environmentally and socially sensitive industries.328
Under the EPs incentive theories canvassed in Chapter 5 of this thesis, an
argument can therefore be made that TD falls into the category of a retail bank with
significant exposure to NGO activism and reputational issues. This finding is also
consistent with TD’s other broad statements and CSR commitments concerning its
lending practices. It is observed that each of these statements is related to recent high
profile environmental and social issues, suggesting that TD is particularly sensitive to
public awareness and attention in these areas. For example, TD states that it “does not
lend money for transactions that would involve activities within World Heritage sites,
would result in the degradation of protected critical natural habitats as designated
according to World Conservation Union classification or would involve the purchase of
timber from illegal logging operations.”329 Moreover, TD states that it does not lend
money for “transactions that are directly related to the trade in or manufacturing of
material for nuclear, chemical or biological weapons or for land mines or cluster
bombs.”330
This research found similar results across the remaining Big-5 Canadian banks as
each of the banks studied also includes broad self-serving statements about the EPs in
their CSR Reports and on-line. For example, BMO sets out its EPs disclosure in the
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broader “Responsible Lending” section of the BMO website, which includes the
following broad statements:
“[A]s lenders, we use sound risk management practices to identify,
evaluate and mitigate to the extent practical the environmental impacts on
credit facilities provided. It is BMO’s intent to avoid dealing with
borrowers who have poor environmental risk management track records.
… Environmental risk is one of many factors considered during the credit
assessment process that results in the decision to accept or reject a loan
application. All eligible borrowers for commercial and corporate loans are
subject to our environmental risk assessment process.”331
However, of the Big-5 Canadian banks studied, BMO had the lowest number of
EPs related project finance deals, with only 10 such transactions disclosed during the
2008 - 2012 period. Further, BMO confirms that, to date, all of its projects financed
under the EPs have been in North America.332 Similarly, despite a relatively small
number of EPs deals, RBC notes that it was the first Canadian bank to adopt the EPs in
2003, and that this step enhanced the bank’s “existing environmental risk management
policies and commitment to sustainable development.”333 RBC also mentions that it “will
provide loans only to those projects that can demonstrate to our satisfaction that key
social and environmental issues have been addressed in accordance with our policies and
processes.”334 CIBC cites “[p]rogress towards the adoption of the Equator Principles” as
an area in which CIBC has made a “number of advances toward achieving its goal of
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promoting sustainability and protecting the environment.”335 BNS identifies its adoption
of the EPs as one of its “key achievements” in the area of CSR and cites the principles as
an example of the way the bank “evaluates environmental factors as part of our lending
and investment decisions.”336
These results show that Canadian banks are using the EPs as examples of their
public commitments to CSR and sustainability despite the fact that they have reported
only a small number of cases in which they have used the principles in practice.
Moreover, as discussed below in Section 6.2(b) of this thesis, Canadian banks fail to
provide any meaningful disclosure surrounding their implementation of the EPs or the
extent to which they are applying the principles within their businesses. Taken together,
these findings reinforce the finding that Canadian banks are currently using the EPs
primarily for the important reputational benefits they offer.

(b) Are Canadian banks’ EPs disclosures adequate and credible?
The results of this study show that the EPs reporting and disclosure by Canadian
banks is limited. Although each bank claims to attach great importance to the EPs (see
Section 6.2(a) of this thesis), their disclosure fails to go much beyond the bare minimum
required by Principle 10. Notably absent from Canadian banks’ EPs reporting, for
example, are relevant details concerning project information and the results (if any) of the
banks’ EPs analysis and implementation. This makes it impossible to determine whether
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EPs adoption in Canada is having an impact on social and environmental outcomes and,
more generally, provides additional evidence to support the conclusion that Canadian
banks are primarily interested in the reputational benefits of EPs adoption.
It should be noted, however, that some of the Canadian banks studied do take the
additional and optional step of providing general geographic and market sector
breakdowns of their EPs projects (a step that is only optionally required under Principle
10 of the EPs). For example, RBC segments its EPs reporting by geographic region,
distinguishing between OECD and non-OECD countries. RBC also provides general
industry sector categories as follows: Energy (non-renewable); Energy (renewable) and
Infrastructure.337 TD segments its EPs reporting by country and specific market sectors
(e.g. “Oil and gas extraction” and “Real estate”).338 However, TD also notes that all of its
EPs projects were located in North America during the period 2008 - 2012.339 Similarly,
BMO confirms that all its EPs projects to date have been in North America, but it does
not provide market sector specific information.340 CIBC segments its reporting between
“Within Canada and the U.S.” and “Outside Canada and the U.S.”341 However, unlike TD
and BMO, CIBC reports that it does have projects taking place outside of Canada and the
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U.S., with 6 such projects disclosed in 2012.342 BNS provides a breakdown of its EPs
projects on a percentage basis by country. Interestingly, BNS does appear to have some
international project financing activity as it lists Mexico and South America as two of its
geographic categories. In 2008, for example, BNS reported that 30 percent of its EPs
projects were located in these jurisdictions.343 BNS has subsequently grouped these two
reporting areas into a category defined as “Latin America” and reported that 20 percent of
its EPs projects were located in that area in 2012.344 However, BNS does not provide an
industry sector breakdown and offers no explanation for this omission.
This is the extent of Canadian banks’ EPs reporting and, as a result, this area
should emerge as an obvious area of concern. This result is also consistent with the
findings of Macve and Chen who concluded in their study that general and self-serving
statements about the EPs do “not seem very helpful for readers who want to know about
the impact of EP.”345 Further, these results are consistent with the academic commentary
canvassed in Section 5.3 of this thesis that has identified the lack of transparency and
accountability in EPs compliance as significant areas of concern.346 For example,
Richardson’s conclusion in the Canadian context is on point:
“there is little evidence that Canadian banks pay careful attention to the
long-term environmental performance of borrowers. Indeed, Canadian
banks have been publicly criticized for not being more open about the
342
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social and environmental aspects and effects of their financing. … While
the Canadian Bankers Association (“CBA”) has made public relations
statements about the environment and banking, apart from the usual selfinterested statements about protecting banks from environmental liability,
the CBA’s contributions have been rather brief and superficial.”347

(c) How far have the EPs become embedded in Canadian banking?
There is anecdotal market evidence to show that the EPs are becoming embedded
in Canadian banks’ decision making. Canadian business law firm McCarthy Tétrault LLP
notes, for example, that the EPs provide a framework for assessing and managing social
and environmental risks in projects across industry sectors in Canada, including energy,
mining, oil and gas, and infrastructure projects.348 Similarly, other Canadian observers
have commented that the EPs are not only seen as a benchmark in project finance in
Canada, but are being used more widely in other areas of banking as well.349 McCarthy’s
concludes on this point that that the “standards of the EPs for identifying and managing
the credit risks inherent to project financing uniformly across the financial sector are
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perceived as mitigating risks of default, and so should be directly related to the banks’
financial interests in all industry sectors.”350
It is important to point out, however, that some of the claims regarding the impact
of the EPs are based on the still unproven argument that, because project finance
typically involves syndicated loans, the presence of an EPs bank should cause the nonmember banks of the syndicate to either raise their review processes to a level closer to
compliance with the EPs or otherwise benefit from the greater level of oversight required
by the EPs.351 Amalric notes on this point, for example, that project finance often requires
loan syndications whereby a lead arranger brings together a group of banks to provide
financing for a project. If, as in the case of the EPs, “a sufficiently large group of banks
adopts a new standard, leading arrangers may find it difficult to get a deal through that
does not conform to this standard. The costs of arranging a deal without the participation
of banks having adopted it will increase and may supersede the costs of abiding by the
standard. If this is the case, leading arrangers will decide to adopt the new standard, and
de facto all lenders will also abide by it.”352 However, Freshfields cautions against
unrealistic expectations in this area given the structure of project financing arrangements.
Ultimately, Freshfields argues that the potential leverage of lenders over borrowers’
environmental performance may be limited because EPs banks may not get involved in a
syndicated project financing deal until late in the game when basic project choices and
design decisions have already been made and agreed to.353
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Another way to determine the impact of the EPs is to consider the extent to which
the principles are becoming embedded in the internal policies and procedures of member
banks.354 On this point, there is some preliminary evidence to suggest that Canadian
banks involved in project finance (domestically or abroad) may be using the EPs as an
informal internal standard to determine if a transaction is well managed from both a
credit risk and a reputational viewpoint.355Consistent with this, BNS notes that it has a
“comprehensive set of tools and guidance documents to help ensure banking and credit
officers have the necessary information to meet the Equator Principles requirements.”356
BNS also maintains that it reinforces its commitment to the EPs by providing employees
with training on how to “[i]ncorporate the principles into their work.”357 Similarly, RBC
states that it employs its own “Enterprise-wide ESRM Policy,” under which it considers
the impact of environmental and social factors in all of its activities, not just financing.
RBC also states that the bank screens all of its debt and equity underwriting activities,
and corporate credit facilities, for environmental and social risk, regardless of whether the
use of proceeds is known. Under these broader policies, RBC claims that it performed
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detailed environmental credit risk assessments on over 1,100 transactions in Canada and
the U.S. in 2011.358
Interestingly, TD appears to be taking EPs implementation a step further in this
area, formally stating in its 2011 CSR Report that it has “fully embedded the principles
within its credit risk management policy applied to all undertakings including general
corporate purpose, project and fixed-asset financing.”359 TD claims that this will “ensure
that they are applied to all forms of lending – not just project finance. This progressive
and proactive step ensures that all transactions receive a consistent review, and we
believe it reflects the direction toward which the Equator Principles should be
evolving.”360 TD has now undertaken to update its internal credit risk management
policy, procedures and sector-specific due diligence guidance documents in 2013 to
reflect these changes.361
TD is not alone in this regard as commentators suggest in the international context
that other banks are doing this as well as the EPs “have gradually spilled over into the
everyday financings of some investment banks.”362 They reference, for example, the
358
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website of Morgan Stanley, where that bank states that it has “adopted explicit limitations
on financing or investing in projects that would, among other things: significantly
degrade a critical habitat; support companies engaged in illegal logging; support
extraction or logging projects in World Heritage sites; or violate local and World Bank
pollution standards.”363 Similarly, Macve and Chen note that Barclays has stated that it
also applied the “spirit” of the EPs to 268 non-project finance deals in 2006.364

6.3 Conclusion
Macve and Chen concluded in their U.K. study of EPs adoption that the EPs have
been among the most successful of the many initiatives relating to corporate social and
environmental performance.365 They further concluded that the EPs operate as “soft law”
in the regulatory space between individual voluntary action and legally mandated
regulation and that this provides an example of the business case for CSR.366 However,
the authors also note that any social or environmental benefits of the EPs should be
viewed primarily as a “by-product” of banks’ risk management processes rather than their
main objective.367 To put it another way, the authors argue that promotion of CSR values
is “primarily an advantageous outcome rather than the core objective for banks signing
up to EP.”368 Overall, they noted that the EPs disclosures by Barclays and HSBC remain
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too “highly summarized for outsiders to know how EP has impacted on individual
decisions.”369 Macve and Chen also note that concerns about free-riding arise in this
context because any bank “who joined the “club” could gain some reputational benefits
from merely announcing that, regardless of their true compliance.”370
The results of this Chapter show that many of these issues apply in the Canadian
context. Canadian banks do not at present have extensive EPs project financing activities
so the EPs’ high adoption rate in Canada suggests that Canadian banks are primarily
interested in the important reputational benefits offered by the principles.371 This, in turn,
suggests that Canadian banks view the EPs primarily as a useful public relations tool that
helps them to substantiate broad self-serving statements about their CSR initiatives.
Moreover, although Canadian banks claim to attach great importance to the EPs, their
disclosures fail to go much beyond the bare minimum required by Principle 10. Notably
absent from Canadian EPs reporting, are relevant details concerning project information
and the results (if any) of the banks’ EPs analysis. These findings therefore reinforce
existing criticisms of Canadian banks in this area and demonstrate the lack of
transparency surrounding the social and environmental effects of their financings.
Despite this, this research did uncover some positive trends in the EPs practices of
Canadian banks and these should merit further study. For example, although it is
premature to draw any conclusions in this area, it is submitted here that the commitment
by TD and other banks to implement the EPs within their broader businesses may provide
369
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preliminary support for the social context styles of regulation discussed in Chapter 5. For
example, TD may be in the process of engaging in its own “internal reflection” about
what form EPs compliance should take and this provides a practical example of the
“reflexive” and “soft law” styles of regulation discussed in Section 5.2 of this thesis.
Moreover, as Conley and Williams argue, this sort of behavior may act as a catalyst for
cultural change within the bank.372 Although likely to be more controversial, these
developments may also provide early support for the psychological theory of CSR
regulation advocated by Rupp and Williams.373 Under this theory, for example, the
results of this study suggest that TD may be in the early stages of a gradual shift toward
“internalization of environmental and social values,” thereby evidencing what Rupp and
Williams argue is a commitment to ethical norms that are beyond the minimum
requirements of the EPs.374
These results may also be indicative of changes in the broader banking industry.
On this point, for example, Rupp and Williams point to the wide-spread adoption of the
EPs to argue that this could provide evidence of a change within the banking sector
generally, and that this may represent the beginnings of social and environmental
regulation of global business by the leading EPs banks.375 They point out that, like TD,
there is some evidence that international banks have begun to apply the EPs to social and
environmental standards for sustainable banking across product categories, including
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underwriting, commercial lending, and retail banking, and across industries.376
Ultimately, Rupp and Williams refer to this development as the “contagion” effects of the
EPs: observed examples of the principles being used as a benchmark for setting up social
and environmental standards for other financial practices within the banks (i.e., not
limited to just project finance itself).377

376

Ibid

377

Ibid

106
Chapter 7 Conclusion
7.1 Conclusions and Further Study
The research proposition for this thesis was that Canadian banks are
demonstrating CSR behavior through the steps they are taking to implement and comply
with the EPs. The results of this study provide initial support for this proposition: each of
the Big-5 Canadian banks issues an annual CSR Report and provides for EPs related
disclosure either in their CSR Reports or on other CSR related sections of their websites.
Moreover, each of the banks claims to attach great importance to the EPs and rely on the
principles as an example of their broader public commitments to CSR. There can be little
doubt that these findings provide practical support from the Canadian perspective for the
argument that a shift of business and financial values is occurring leading toward greater
importance being attributed to CSR considerations in the banking sector.
However, this conclusion is tempered by the general finding in this thesis that
banks use the EPs primarily for self-interested reasons. As noted in Chapter 5, the EPs
related scholarship identifies that banks adopt the EPs primarily because there are
significant business incentives to do so. In short, the EPs are “good for business,”
particularly as tools to manage (i) the credit risk inherent in global project financing; and
(ii) the reputational risk associated with the large scale infrastructure projects in socially
and environmentally sensitive areas. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 5, these motives
for EPs adoption are held to be instrumental, in that they are focused on the means for the
participating banks to advance their own interests.
This is not necessarily inconsistent with CSR to the extent that the business case
for CSR contemplates self-interested business motivations as being a primary driver of
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corporate activity. As a result, this study also confirms the approach of scholars who have
studied the EPs in the context of the business case for CSR. As discussed in Chapter 5,
scholars have established the business case or “value add” of the EPs through their
enhanced mitigation of credit and reputational risks, thereby increasing EPs banks’
competitive advantage vis-à-vis non adopters. However, the business case for CSR also
requires integration of business incentives with social and environmental concerns. On
this point, it is submitted here that, while the EPs are evidently “good for business,” there
is no clear indication that they have resulted in positive social or environmental
outcomes.378 Further, as discussed in Chapter 5, the lack of full disclosure and adequate
reporting in this area remains a serious area of concern as it is virtually impossible to
substantiate any claims about the positive impact of the EPs in practice.379
In the Canadian context specifically, the results of this study show that Canadian
banks adopt the EPs primarily for the important reputational benefits the principles offer:
Canadian banks do not currently have significant EPs related project financing activities
so the incentive to manage credit risk is not, practically speaking, present. As discussed
in Chapter 6, this finding leads to obvious questions surrounding the legitimacy of claims
about the importance of EPs adoption as part of Canadian banks’ overall “responsible
lending” and credit risk management initiatives.380 Moreover, each of the Canadian banks
studied makes broad self-serving statements about the value of their commitments to the
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EPs. However, despite these claims, this study shows that the EPs disclosure by Canadian
banks generally fails to go much beyond the bare minimum required by Principle 10.
As noted in Chapter 6, these results reinforce the existing criticisms of EPs banks
canvassed in Chapter 5: lack of transparency (the EPs do not mandate procedural
mechanisms for reviewing and monitoring compliance) and accountability (the EPs do
not include mechanisms to enforce compliance with banks’ voluntary commitments).
This may ultimately serve to provide NGOs with further support for their argument that
EPs compliance should be made into a legal requirement.381 Several writers have
addressed these issues by offering suggested improvements to the EPs reporting
framework and significant further study will be required in this area.382 Hardenbrook
argues, for example, that one way to determine whether the EPs impact banking decisions
would be to examine the policies and procedures that banks have implemented to meet
the EPs’ standards.383 As another possibility, Hardenbrook notes it would be helpful to
examine whether there have been any changes in loan covenants to reflect the EPs’
requirements. Hardenbrook argues that this might be the most important indication of a
bank’s commitment to the EPs, because it gives direct legal redress if the borrower fails
to fully comply.384 However, Hardenbrook concedes that this information would be
difficult to obtain on a broad scale because of the confidentiality of loan agreements and
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the fact that banks typically do not disclose information regarding specific projects that
have been turned down for their failure to meet the EPs’ standards.385
As noted in Chapter 5, there is also on-going debate in this area surrounding the
issue of enforceability: whether the EPs are sufficient as a voluntary code or whether
more mandatory requirements are needed.386 Commentators have already noted, for
example, that there is the potential for the EPs to evolve into a compulsory requirement,
possibly in the form of an international treaty.387 Similarly, other writers have considered
this issue in the context of whether EPs banks may be sued for violation of the EPs’
standards, or for fraud or false advertising for failing to comply with the principles.388
These developments will support calls from NGOs who argue that mandatory
requirements should now be established to deter the free-rider problem and to allow a
uniform way of enforcing the EPs.389
However, other commentators note that the principles have been successful todate primarily because they promote wider adoption rates as a voluntary initiative.390
Similarly, commentators note that, in resisting calls for a mandatory independent system,
EPs banks argue that the high level of public scrutiny and media attention in this area
ensures that breaches in compliance will be exposed.391 However, it is submitted here that
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it remains unclear how “public scrutiny and media attention” are to be effective in
ensuring compliance if banks fail to adequately disclose and report on their EPs activities
in the first place. On this point, in their recent survey of international EPs reporting,
lawyers Christopher Langdon and Claudia O’Brien of the international law firm Latham
& Watkins LLP, confirmed that EPs underreporting by member banks is a “legitimate
practical concern.”392 They noted that, while all banks in their study reported the number
of EPs projects, few described the role the EPs play in decision-making processes making
it difficult to assess the EPs’ overall impact.393
Ultimately, this thesis shows that many of these issues arise in the Canadian
context. The findings in Chapter 6 show that there is clearly room for improvement for
Canadian banks, particularly in the areas of EPs reporting and disclosure, and further
study will be needed to see if Canadian banks are mindful of these concerns as they move
forward in their EPs implementation and other CSR programs. It will also be interesting
to see if Canadian banks move toward limiting their use of vague self-serving statements
about the EPs in order to avoid being labeled with the free-rider and other associated
problems discussed in Chapter 5. As noted above, concerns about free-riding arise in the
context of the EPs because no formal mechanisms exist to screen or monitor the practices
of adopting banks, meaning that all adopters are likely to gain some reputational benefits
irrespective of their actual compliance practices. Developments in this area should be
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monitored closely as some commentators have already concluded that free-riding could
pose a substantial threat to the EPs if the practice becomes a trend in the banking sector.
One positive (and somewhat surprising) development identified in Chapter 6 is
the decision by TD to adopt the EPs more generally into its broader commercial lending
activities. As discussed in Section 6.3 of this thesis, and although further study will be
needed to monitor TD’s success in implementing this initiative, this result is interesting in
that it may provide early practical evidence to support the developing CSR scholarship in
this area canvassed in Chapter 5.394 Moreover, this finding provides further evidence in
support of the trend identified in this thesis as a shift of business and financial values
toward greater importance being attributed to CSR considerations in the financial sector.
Importantly, the TD case also provides evidence of a step forward in the
important area of EPs scope expansion (the idea that banks should use the EPs beyond
project finance transactions). In its recent submissions to the EPs Association on the
development of EP III, for example, BankTrack stated that scope expansion is the most
important area of improvement needed for the EPs to achieve their full potential.395 Also
interesting are TD’s broader statements about its refusal to lend money for transactions
that would involve the degradation of internationally protected habitats, the purchase of
timber from illegal logging operations or the trade in or manufacturing of material for
prohibited weapons.396 Subject to concerns expressed above surrounding free-riding and
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the accuracy of this reporting, this result appears to show explicit private sector
endorsement of public international treaties, and scholars are already considering
implications for further study on these issues.397
In addition to developments in the Canadian context, there will be a number of
opportunities for further study in the context of the EPs internationally. For example,
further study will be needed to see if continuing geopolitical shifts result in changes to
the EPs adoption patterns currently identified by Wright and Rwabizambuga as being
primarily concentrated in Western European and North American banks.398 On this point,
it is interesting that at the time of writing only one Chinese bank, Industrial Bank Co.,
Ltd, is listed among member banks.399 However, with the increased media and public
criticism of banks in China, Langdon and O’Brien note that it remains to be seen whether
more Chinese banks will adopt the EPs to take advantage of reputational benefits.400 They
cite unidentified sources as stating that government bodies in China have improved their
environmental standards in response to the EPs:
“[o]ne source says that the Chinese banking regulator in 2007 improved
its standards with help from the international banking community, because
of increased scrutiny of Chinese activity in Africa. Another states that the
Chinese equivalent of the Environmental Protection Agency introduced
the principles into its green credit policy after criticism from the World
Bank president, and has actually withheld loans from companies that
violated the environmental rules. This shows that the principles can carry
powerful force even outside of the private project finance sector.” 401
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Beyond China, the EPs do appear to be making inroads into other areas of the
globe, with 5 banks from South Africa having signed on,402 and several Latin American
adopters as well.403 Notably underrepresented, however, are banks from Eastern
European states, Russia, Asia and the Middle East.404 One possible area of concern that
could be relevant here is that the EPs Association may not want to broaden membership
to admit new members from emerging markets that do not have the resources to comply
with the principles.405 Although likely to be controversial, this explanation for the
primarily western adoption patterns should be studied as well.
Several authors have also identified the need for further case studies into
individual EPs projects and specific industries to see how the principles are working on
the ground. Langdon and O’Brien’s recent study goes some way to addressing this need
in the mining context; arguing, by way of reference to global mining companies’
endorsement of the EPs, that
“poor reporting does not necessarily reflect poor implementation of the
principles on the ground. On the contrary, a case study of the mining and
metals industry, where project finance is frequently used, illustrates how
the principles have an impact beyond what the bank reports suggest.
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Evidence from the industry suggests that the principles do have bite, and
that they have influenced mining projects around the globe.”406
This methodology could easily be extended, for example, to Canada, where it is
argued that the EPs, together with other international frameworks, may have already
evolved to address many of the CSR related issues in the extractive industry.407
Finally, the EPs’ impact on the practice of banking lawyers should be studied.
Some practicing lawyers have already commented that, depending on one’s point of
view, the EPs can be either a lawyer’s dream or nightmare: they “vastly expand the scope
of requirements to which borrowers agree to be subject, to include not only those
required by law, but also the standards of … the safeguard guidelines, and any projectspecific procedures specified in the EMP.”408 However, they note that, although the EPs
appear to provide an important breakthrough in environmental and social issues, a close
reading of them reveals
“a set of requirements that is ambiguous at best. They are filled with
potential “loopholes” that are only made wider and less defined by the
guidelines which they incorporate by reference. Their value from either
the lender-signatories’ points of view or those of public skeptics is open to
significant question because of these uncertainties. In general, for all
constituencies (or stakeholders), the ambiguity of the Principles presents
both an opportunity and a risk.”409
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7.2 Further Study: EP III
There will be significant opportunity for further study surrounding the
implementation of the EP III update in 2013 and 2014. In particular, it will be interesting
to see how, if it all, the concerns of NGOs and other commentators are addressed. As
noted in Chapter 4, the EP III update is based on the IFC’s review of the IFC
Performance Standards and update of its Sustainability Framework, which were relaunched in January 2012.410 A draft of the EP III was released for stakeholder
consultation and public comment on August 13, 2012 and the formal Stakeholder
Consultation and Public Comment period closed on October 12, 2012. The EP III update
has now been launched effective as of June 4, 2013, but subject to a transition period
ending on December 31, 2013.411 The transition period will allow EP II to be applied to
new transactions (i.e. where the mandate is signed after June 4, 2013) up to the end of the
transition period.412
As at the date of submission of this thesis, the results of the EP III update remain
to be seen. In this regard, the EPs Association has identified the following key objectives
of the EP III update:
To ensure the EPs Association members continue to appropriately manage
environmental and social risk and impacts for their institutions, clients and
relevant stakeholders with regard to the financing of projects,
To reflect the recent update of the IFC Performance Standards, and
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To maintain the level playing field on which international and local financial
institutions operate, with regards to sustainable financing objectives.413
However, NGOs are quick to point out that the EPs Association qualified its
commitment from the beginning of the update process by stating that “all of these topics
would require formal amendment to the EPs and/or EP Association Governance Rules
and a voting process by the entire EPs Association membership - the results of which
cannot, at the time of this statement, be fully assured.”414 As a result, NGOs continue to
criticize the EP III update and BankTrack in particular has pointed out that the review
process took well over two years since the EPs Association’s first announcement of its
intention to create the EP III in 2010. BankTrack has since confirmed its frustration on
these issues and has demanded firm commitments from the EPs Association; failing
which, it argues that the EPs Association will have failed to achieve any meaningful
improvements with EP III.415
More specifically, critics have identified significant room for improvement in
three principal areas: scope extension (banks should use the principles for all types of
commercial financing); transparency (banks should provide full disclosure) and
accountability (banks should report at the project level and allow for appropriate review
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of project decisions).416 The EPs Association, in turn, responded that the EP III would
address these concerns through three key areas of improvement:
An extension in the scope of the EPs to Project-Related Corporate Loans
and Bridge Loans.
New requirements related to managing impacts on climate.
Greater emphasis on human rights considerations in due diligence.
A strengthening of reporting and transparency requirements.417
More specifically, in terms of scope expansion, the EP III state that coverage will
be extended to “Project-Related Corporate Loans,” which the EP III define according to
the following criteria: (i) the majority of the loan is related to a single project; (ii) the
total aggregate loan amount is at least U.S. $100 million; (iii) the bank’s individual initial
exposure is at least U.S. $50 million; and (iv) the loan tenor is at least two years.418 In
terms of reporting and transparency, the new Principle 10 will require that, for all
Category A and, as appropriate, Category B projects, the bank must require the borrower
to disclose the EPs related assessment documentation for the project online.419 The new
“Annex B - Minimum Reporting Requirements” will also provide for additional reporting
by EPs banks: (i) Data Reporting (similar to the reporting requirements currently in place
under EP II); (ii) Implementation Reporting for the first year of adoption, and thereafter
416
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as deemed relevant by the banks (this requires the bank to report on its implementation of
the EPs, including the mandate of the EPs related staff and their responsibilities, level of
senior management involvement and incorporation of the EPs in their credit and risk
management policies); and (iii) Project-Specific Data Reporting (including project name,
sector, region and the year of project financial close).420
There is no question that these developments will provide an improvement over
EP II.421 Even BankTrack concedes this point, and acknowledges the steps forward in the
areas of scope extension and the commitment to report on and disclose more project
specific information.422 However, for some commentators, including BankTrack, these
steps do not go far enough. On this point, for example, it is observed that the defining
criteria for the inclusion of “Project-Related Corporate Loans” is very specific, meaning
that it is unlikely that many more loans will be captured under the EP III framework than
is currently the case under EP II. The EPs Association justifies this restrictive position by
stating that “[i]n general, financial institutions have a lesser degree of influence/leverage
over a project financed through a Corporate Loan. There is also a higher degree of
competition with financial institutions in certain geographies including those that are not
EP adopters. Furthermore loans are often arranged in a shorter timescale meaning that
parts of the EP framework would require a different approach.”423

420

See “Annex B” of EP III, Ibid.

421

See e.g. the online article by lawyers of international law firm Norton Rose Fulbright LLP, available at:
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/80287/equator-principles-iii-is-approved-andlaunched-new-trends-and-a-strategy-rethink
422

See e.g., “BankTrack comments on draft Equator Principles III, Tiny steps forward, where bold moves
are required” Oct 11 2012 [Bold Moves], available online at:
http://www.banktrack.org/show/news/banktrack_comments_on_draft_equator_principles_iii
423

See Frequently asked Questions, supra note 413 at 12.

119
Similarly, the Project-Specific Data reporting will be subject to obtaining the
borrower’s consent and will only be applicable to projects that have closed successfully
(this is an important qualification because it means that the requirement will not apply
where the borrower refuses consent or where projects are denied for financing because
they fail to meet the EPs criteria). As a result, even the EPs Association concedes that this
enhanced transparency is an important but incomplete step; and acknowledges that it will
take both time and experience to create a level playing field in the area of transparency
and accountability.424
As noted above, the full impact of the EP III update process remains to be seen.
Critics continue to doubt that the EP III will have achieved meaningful improvements
and BankTrack, in particular, has argued that “bigger steps must be taken by the
Association if the new Equator Principles are to become a leading initiative on
sustainable finance.”425 However, it is submitted here that BankTrack’s argument that the
EPs Association is prepared to take only “tiny steps where bold moves are required”426
appears overly aggressive and likely goes too far. The EPs Association has clearly
confirmed its commitment to improving the principles with EP III as a work in progress
and member banks continue to devote their own significant resources and efforts to this
endeavor. Although not yet a perfect mechanism for ensuring positive social and
environmental outcomes, the EPs represent a significant effort in this regard and
represent an opportunity to examine how this form of CSR works in practice. The EP III

424

Ibid at 13.

425

See e.g., Bold Moves, supra note 422.

426

Ibid
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update process may represent only a small step forward in this area but, clearly, it
represents a further step in the right direction.
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